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Foreword
In the shadow of the recent Iraq war, it is easy to accept that “growth and diffusion of
stealth, precision, and information technology” has truly heralded the long-awaited
revolution in military affairs. American leaders—from the President to the Pentagon
military and civilian leadership—have called for dramatic transformation of each of
the services to fit this revolution. In many ways, this is a far harder task.
It is the purpose of this Newport Paper to examine the views of military officers on
that prospect, a critical and unstudied factor in the implementation of transformation.
Its coauthors, Professors Mahnken and FitzSimonds, are members of the Naval War
College faculty—Dr. Mahnken in the Strategy and Policy Department and Captain
FitzSimonds (U.S. Navy, Retired) in the War Gaming Department’s Research and
Analysis Division.
The authors argue that the opinions of military officers on transformation are crucial,
and not just because these attitudes guide the transformation process. They are critical
also because receptivity to change in this group will affect innovation, both now and
when today’s mid-grade officers assume senior leadership posts. It is from some, but
not all, of today’s military officers that further transformation impulses will come.
Accordingly, Mahnken and FitzSimonds explore a number of questions fundamental in
the present and for the future of the American military establishment. What is the level
of enthusiasm among officers for transformation? How compelling do they perceive
the need for transformation to be? How extensive a change do they believe is necessary?
How confident are they in the ability of the U.S. military to carry out transformation?
We believe that this study is in itself as innovative as the military transformation that forms
its broad subject, and we are pleased to bring it to the attention of a broad range of naval,
academic, and policy readers. We are grateful for the generous support of the Smith
Richardson Foundation for this publication and wish specially to thank Jo-Ann Parks of JIL
Information Systems and David Chapman of Chapman and Partners for their skillful prep-
aration of the many tables that undergird this most impressive analytic monograph.
C A T H E R I N E M C A R D L E K E L L E H E R
Editor, Naval War College Press
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Innovation and the U.S. Officer Corps
Over the past decade, a significant number of defense analysts, government officials,
and military officers have argued that the growth and diffusion of stealth, precision,
and information technology will drastically alter the character and conduct of future
wars, yielding a revolution in military affairs (RMA). The idea that the emergence of
new technology, combined with innovative operational concepts and organizations,
would transform the conduct of war, first appeared in Soviet military writings in the
late 1970s.1 It was, however, the seeming ease with which the U.S.-led coalition defeated
Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War that led many observers in the United States and else-
where to conclude that significant changes in the character of warfare were underway.2
Since the mid-1990s, exploiting the emerging RMA has been an explicit goal of the De-
fense Department.3 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgated Joint Vision
2010 with great fanfare in 1996 as the “conceptual template” for how the armed forces
would “leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in war-
fighting.”4 Each of the services has devoted considerable attention to developing new
technology as well as the concepts and organizations needed to employ it most effectively.
George W. Bush campaigned on a pledge to exploit the information revolution by skip-
ping a generation of technology. In a September 1999 speech at the Citadel military
college, then-governor Bush noted that “our military is still organized more for cold
war threats than the challenges of the new century—for industrial-age operations,
rather than information-age battles.”5 Transforming the U.S. armed forces became one
of the Bush administration’s top priorities when it took office. Speaking at the Norfolk
Navy Base in February 2001, President Bush promised to “move beyond marginal im-
provements to harness new technologies that will support a new strategy.” He called for
the development of ground forces that are lighter, more mobile, and more lethal, as well
as manned and unmanned air forces capable of striking across the globe with precision.6
Soon after assuming office, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed Andrew W.
Marshall, long time director of the Office of Net Assessment, to conduct a fundamental
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review of U.S. strategy and force requirements. He also commissioned a panel of senior
experts to develop a transformation strategy for the Pentagon.7 However, early propos-
als to reduce the size of the U.S. armed forces and cancel major acquisition programs to
fund the development of new weapon systems garnered opposition among members of
Congress and senior members of the armed services.8 The Defense Department’s 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review contained none of the radical changes that had originally
been discussed within the Pentagon.9
The seemingly unique demands of the war on terrorism led to renewed attention to the
issue of transforming the U.S. armed forces. In a second speech at the Citadel on 11
December 2001, President Bush repeated his call for military transformation. Arguing
that “the conflict in Afghanistan has taught us more about the future of our military
than a decade of blue ribbon panels and think-tank symposiums,” Bush called upon
the military to field forces that would rely more heavily on unmanned air vehicles and
precision-guided munitions. He also warned that “every service and every constituency
of our military must be willing to sacrifice some of their pet projects. Our war on ter-
ror cannot be used to justify obsolete bases, obsolete programs, or obsolete weapons.
Every dollar of defense spending must meet a single test: It must help us build the deci-
sive power we will need to win the wars of the future.”10
While the proposition that the advent of the information age demands that we trans-
form the U.S. armed forces has received considerable attention in the press and has
been discussed widely by academic experts and defense analysts, one of the elements
that has so far been lacking is a systematic analysis of the attitudes of military officers
toward the transformation. The purpose of this study is to fill this void. Specifically, it
addresses the following questions:
• Are officers enthusiastic, ambivalent, or skeptical toward the proposition that we are
today in an RMA?
• How compelling, in their view, is the need to transform the U.S. armed forces to
exploit the emerging RMA?
• What is the depth and character of change that they believe is required?
• How confident are they in the U.S. military’s ability to innovate?
Innovation and the Officer Corps
There are several reasons why an understanding of the attitudes of most officers would
seem to be very important to the process of transformation. First, they will be the ulti-
mate practitioners of the new (or old) ways of warfare. The extent to which they ap-
proach change with a positive attitude may have much to do with the success or failure
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of new technologies, operational concepts, and organizations. A second reason is that
although very few officers will likely emerge as true innovators, it would seem that the
existence of a general climate within the officer corps that is open to change will en-
courage individuals both to generate new ideas and to remain in the service to help
them come to fruition. A third reason is that a large percentage of career-oriented offi-
cers will rise to senior leadership positions within their services in the next 10 to 20 years.
In those roles, they will establish command climates that will either support or inhibit
risk-taking and innovation. Past research has demonstrated the importance to innovation
of senior officers who protect and nurture the careers of young innovators under their
command who are willing to take risks.11 Finally, military officers are the recognized ex-
perts in military affairs in the United States. They are, or should be, expected to take a
leading role in determining the need for adopting different approaches to warfare.
Strategic analysts differ over just how enthusiastic the U.S. armed forces are about
emerging warfare areas. In each case, however, judgments are the result of anecdotal
evidence rather than systematic study. Williamson Murray, for example, has portrayed
the current officer corps as wildly passionate about technology. He argues that “The
new generation of officers, with the exception of the Marine Corps, has proven far
more attracted by technological, mechanistic solutions to the complex problems raised
by war” than their predecessors.12 Citing public statements and articles written by
high-ranking officers, he concludes that the Army, Navy and Air Force more and more
see technology as a “silver bullet,” a development he characterizes as “dangerous.”13
Andrew Krepinevich, by contrast, argues that the services are profoundly conservative,
and that their planning and acquisition are governed by questionable—and potentially
outmoded—assumptions drawn from the Gulf War. He argues that by preparing for
the last war, officers can avoid challenging existing cultures and the dominance they ac-
cord to armored combat on land, carrier battle groups at sea, and tactical fighters in
the air. They are reluctant to embrace new ways of war, such as unmanned aerial com-
bat, which threatens the Air Force’s pilot culture. They also resist the growing role of
non-warfighters. As he puts it, “if history is any guide, the combat culture will prove
reluctant to accept a growing role for such nontraditional warriors.”14
Similarly, Eliot Cohen paints a picture of services that are dominated by officers who
are wedded to technology and concepts that are of declining utility. He argues that
“the services cling to established ways of war, and to combinations of technology, or-
ganizations, and personnel systems that have come to acquire value in and of them-
selves—even if they are no longer entirely functional.” He notes, however, that each
service also contains groups of officers who are enthusiastic about new ways of warfare.
Some Air Force generals, for example, are eager to see uninhabited combat aerial
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vehicles (UCAVs) supplement manned aircraft; some Army generals are interested in ex-
perimenting with light infantry and long-range precision strike systems; and some
Navy admirals are in favor of network-centric warfare. “Behind them are far greater
numbers of junior officers ready to experiment with the technologies and operational
concepts that can make such notions reality.”15
The officer corps is hardly united over the implications of the information revolution
for the conduct of war. Rather, several schools of thought have emerged. Eliot A. Co-
hen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, and Andrew J. Bacevich, for example, divide the strategic
studies community into disciples of the technological enthusiast Admiral William
Owens, “Uncertain Revolutionaries,” “Gulf War Veterans,” and “Skeptics.”16 The authors
of the International Institute for Strategic Studies Strategic Survey, by contrast, view the
debate over the emerging RMA in terms of “Platform-Oriented Traditionalists” and
“Information-Oriented Modernists.”17 Ian Roxborough and Dana Eyre argue that the
services are pursuing four radically different images of future war, ranging from a
high-technology “systemic war” dominated by precision-guided missiles and space
weaponry to a gritty “peacewar” characterized by constabulary missions among failed
states.18 Scholars who have studied foreign writings on future warfare have detected
contending schools of thought as well. In his study of Russian lessons of the Gulf War,
for example, Stuart Kaufman identified three different views of future warfare.19 Mi-
chael Pillsbury, for his part, has identified a major school of thought among Chinese
military theorists that advocates exploitation of the emerging RMA.20
If significant differences in officer attitudes do exist, then what is their source? What, in
other words, accounts for an officer’s attitude toward innovation? Studies of past inno-
vations indicate that an officer’s rank may influence his enthusiasm toward new ways
of war. In his study of innovation in the U.S. Navy, Vincent Davis concluded that the
small number of true service innovators come from officers from the middle ranks
with approximately 15 years commissioned service. He also observed that the innova-
tion advocates are generally officers who possess unique, specialized knowledge and are
passionate zealots who subordinate concerns for their own professional careers to the
promotion of new concepts.21 It is worth noting, however, that Davis’ conclusions rest
upon a relatively small number of cases. Barton Hacker’s study of the attitudes of Brit-
ish army officers toward mechanization between the two world wars revealed that
lower- and middle-ranking officers were more enthusiastic about mechanization than
senior and retired officers.22
An officer’s service affiliation may also influence his attitude toward innovation. Carl
Builder has argued that each service has its own personality, one that has been shaped
by its experience and in turn shapes its behavior. The Air Force, for example, places
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greater emphasis on technology than do the other services. The Army and Marine
Corps, by contrast, place much greater emphasis on the human element of combat.23 It
is reasonable to expect, therefore, that Air Force officers may be the most enthusiastic
and Army and Marine Corps officers the least enthusiastic about emerging warfare
areas. Robert Leonhard and Don Vandergriff—both Army officers—have argued that
the Army’s culture has led it to ignore the potential of new ways of war.24 Navy officers
may be more enthusiastic than Army and Marine Corps officers, but less enthusiastic
than Air Force officers.
An officer’s branch affiliation may similarly affect his attitude toward innovation.
Barton Hacker, for example, found that British army officers’ branch affiliation
strongly affected their views of armored warfare: an overwhelming number of officers
from the infantry and cavalry opposed mechanized forces, while many from the techni-
cal branches favored them.25 One should similarly expect that officers from combat arms
and branches would be less enthusiastic about emerging warfare areas than others.
Combat experience may also influence attitudes toward innovation. Cognitive research
shows that people learn most from firsthand experience, from events early in life, and
from events that have important consequences.26 Combat experience provides one of the
most compelling sources of expectations about the character and conduct of future wars.
It is reasonable to expect that combat veterans of a given service may be less enthusias-
tic about the emerging RMA than non-veterans of equivalent rank. Ground combat in
particular has historically been characterized by considerable “fog” and “friction,” and
those who have experienced it firsthand may be more skeptical of claims of radical
change than those who have not. Veterans of humanitarian and peacekeeping opera-
tions such as Haiti and Somalia may be less enthusiastic about the promise of new ways
of war than veterans of more technology-intensive conflicts such as the Gulf War,
Bosnia, and Kosovo.
The history of military innovation indicates that the commissioned officer corps is
critical to the process of force transformation. It is hoped that the data from this survey
will offer better insight into the attitudes and motivations of those officers who will
bear a large part of the burden for creating and leading a U.S. military force that is fully
prepared for the challenges of the 21st century.
T H E L I M I T S O F T R A N S F O R M A T I O N 5

Project Methodology
Our study of officer attitudes toward the emerging revolution in military affairs (RMA)
employed a variety of analytical techniques. First, between May and October 2000, we
conducted a survey of approximately 1,900 students attending seven U.S. professional
military education (PME) institutions. The survey provides an overview of officer atti-
tudes toward the emerging RMA as of mid-2000—before the election of George W.
Bush and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Second, to explore issues that
emerged from the study in greater depth, in September-October 2001 we convened
four focus groups of 10–12 officer students attending the U.S. Naval War College.
These groups were held after the 11 September attacks but before the launch of Opera-
tion ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. Finally, to explore trends in officer attitudes
over time, we analyzed 340 articles on innovation that appeared in eight military pro-
fessional journals between 1990 and 2000. This chapter describes the methodology em-
ployed to carry out each of these tasks.
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NAVY ARMY/AIR FORCE/MARINE CORPS
APPROX YEARS OF
SERVICE AT THAT GRADE
O-1 Ensign Second Lieutenant 1–2
O-2 Lieutenant (JG) First Lieutenant 2–4
O-3 Lieutenant Captain 4–8
O-4 Lieutenant Commander Major 8–14
O-5 Commander Lieutenant Colonel 14–20
O-6 Captain Colonel 20–30
O-7 Rear Admiral (Lower) Brigadier General 22–35
O-8 Rear Admiral (Upper) Major General 22–35
O-9 Vice Admiral Lieutenant General 22–35
O-10 Admiral General 22–35
Officer Grades or Ranks.
Survey
Between March and October 2000, we conducted a survey of students at seven premier
PME institutions: the Naval War College (the College of Naval Command and Staff and
College of Naval Warfare), Air Command and Staff College, Air War College, Army
Command and Staff College, Army War College, National War College, and National
Defense University’s Capstone Course. The survey focused upon officers’ attitudes to-
ward the emerging RMA,27 its perceived impact upon the character and conduct of war,
the perceived need for the services to change to exploit the information revolution, and
the character and depth of change required.
By surveying officers at these institutions, we were able to assess attitudes of junior of-
ficers (O-3 through O-4), senior officers (O-5 through O-6), and flag officers (O-7
through O-8), as well as foreign officers and U.S. government civilians (table 1). Re-
sponses from today’s senior and flag officers offer insight into the attitudes of those
who will be responsible for making decisions about how the armed forces transform
themselves over the next five to ten years. By contrast, today’s junior officers will occupy
the leadership of the U.S. armed forces in 2020–2025. Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps
officers in particular are selected to attend PME institutions based upon their potential for
higher command. These officers represent the future leaders of their services.
The project utilized a written survey instrument. We developed a draft instru-
ment, administered pilot surveys to students at the Naval War College and Naval Post-
graduate School, and revised the instrument based upon feedback from the
respondents. The faculty of the Operations Research Department at the Naval Post-
graduate School also reviewed the instrument. We mailed written surveys to each PME
institution, where they were administered. Completed surveys were sent to the Naval
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PME INSTITUTIONS PRIMARY STUDENT BODY*
Naval War College,
Newport, RI
Navy Lieutenant Commanders (O-4) to
Captains (O-6)
Air Command and Staff College,
Montgomery AFB, AL Air Force Majors (O-4)
Air War College,
Montgomery AFB, AL Air Force Lieutenant Colonels (O-5)
Army Command and Staff College,
Fort Leavenworth, KS Army Majors (O-4)
Army War College,
Carlisle, PA Army Lieutenant Colonels (O-5)
National Defense University,
Washington, D.C.
All service Lieutenant Colonel/Commanders (O-5) to
Major General/Rear Admiral (O-8)
TABLE 1
PME Institutions Surveyed.
* Each PME institution contains students drawn from all services. Most also include U.S. Government
civilians and international officers.
Postgraduate School where survey data were entered into a computer database and
analyzed.
The survey consisted of 36 statements. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree
with each on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicated strong disagreement, 4 uncertainty,
and 7 strong agreement. For analytical purposes, we considered answers of 1, 2, or 3 to
indicate disagreement with the statement, and 5, 6, or 7 to indicate agreement. We also
adopted two different measures of uncertainty: we considered answers of 4 to reflect
genuine uncertainty, while those responses with values of 3, 4, and 5 were considered to
be tending toward uncertainty. The survey also included two sets of pair-wise compari-
sons. Finally, respondents were asked to provide demographic data, such as age, years
of commissioned service, service affiliation, designator/military operational specialty
(MOS), rank, highest degree received, and combat experience. The survey instrument is
presented as Appendix A.
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The vast majority of the officers surveyed had been commissioned prior to 1989. The decade of
the 1990s saw the introduction and popularization of the concept of a revolution in military af-
fairs and the following major world events that likely served to shape officer attitudes:
1990: Sandanista regime turned out in Nicaragua
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
1991: Operation DESERT STORM; widespread use in combat of stealth aircraft,
cruise missiles, satellite navigation, and UAVs
Dissolution of the Soviet Union
1992: U.S. military intervention in Somalia
1993: Start of the eight-year Clinton administration
Terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York
The Battle of Mogadishu
1994: Russian military operations commence in Chechnya
U.S. military intervention in Haiti
Civil war in Rwanda
1995: Bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City
1996: Joint Vision 2010 issued by CJCS
1997: Hong Kong reverts to China
1998: U.S./U.K. air attacks into Iraq (Operation DESERT FOX)
Terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
Nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan
1999: Nato air operations in Kosovo and Yugoslavia (Operation ALLIED FORCE)
The survey was conducted before the terrorist attacks on USS Cole in Yemen (October 2000),
the start of the George W. Bush administration (January 2001), the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon (September 2001), and U.S. military operations in Afghanistan
(2001–2002).
Several caveats are in order. First, we did not assume that the officers that we surveyed
would have expertise in new ways of war—or would even be familiar with many of
these concepts. We were interested in their attitudes, not their expertise or their educa-
tion. Second, we cannot know the officers’ frame of reference in completing the survey.
Finally, although we tried to make the survey as self-explanatory as possible, we cannot
be certain how individual respondents interpreted individual statements. However, we
feel that the focus groups that we convened to discuss the individual statements did
provide us an adequate understanding of how most officers interpreted the language of
the survey instrument.
Description of Survey Population. The survey population consisted of 1,916 individuals
attending seven PME institutions.28 While it is not a fully representative cross-section of
the entire officer corps (that is, a proportional representation of all services and all
specialties within each service), it is representative of the subset of the officer corps
that gets an opportunity to attend military education institutions. Moreover, these
are career officers on track for future leadership roles.
As table 2 shows, the largest number of responses came from the Army’s Command
and General Staff College, followed by the Air Force Command and Staff College. The
survey instrument was provided to all of the students at each institution rather than a
statistical sampling. We considered using statistical sampling, but it proved impractical
because (with the exception of the Naval War College) we lacked access to the demo-
graphic data that would have been necessary to ensure that our sample was representa-
tive of the student body.
The response rate ranged from 27.9 percent at the Air War College to 81.6 percent at
the Army Command and General Staff College (see table 3). The overall response rate
was 66.7 percent, which is considered statistically adequate.29
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PME INSTITUTION
NUMBER OF
RESPONDENTS
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
SURVEY POPULATION
Army Command and
General Staff College 862 45.1
Air Force Command and Staff College 414 21.7
Naval War College 328 17.1
Army War College 134 7.0
National War College 77 4.0
Air War College 73 3.8
Capstone Course 22 1.1
TABLE 2
Responses by Institution.
The officers we surveyed ranged in age from 31 to 63; their median age was 38. Their
commissioned service ranged from 8 to 31 years (see figure 1). The largest segment—
70 percent—was composed of officers with between 11 and 15 years of commissioned
service.
The survey included officers ranging in rank from O-3 (Army, Air Force, Marine Corps
Captain; Navy Lieutenant) to O-9 (Army, Air Force, Marine Corps Lieutenant General;
Navy Vice Admiral). As table 3 shows, the largest portion of the survey population was
composed of O-4 and O-5 level officers.
Current Department of Defense regulations require officers to retire after thirty years
of commissioned service unless selected as flag officers. If current regulations remain
in force, then today’s field-grade officers, the largest proportion of the survey popula-
tion, will be able to remain in uniform until 2020–2025 (see figure 2). Some portion of
this group will remain in the armed forces until 2025–2030.
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PME INSTITUTION
NUMBER OF
STUDENTS
NUMBER OF
SURVEYS RECEIVED
RESPONSE
RATE %
Army Command and
General Staff College 1057 862 81.6
Naval War College 448 328 73.2
Air Force Command and Staff College 596 414 69.5
Capstone Course 40 22 55
Army War College 264 134 50.8
National War College 195 77 39.5
Air War College 262 73 27.9
TABLE 3
Response Rates.
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FIGURE 1
Respondents’ Years of Commissioned Service.
The survey included officers from all services, their reserve components, and the Na-
tional Guard. It also included international officers and U.S. Government civilians.
The survey population included 173 officers (9.8 percent) who served in Haiti, 158
(11.1 percent) who served in Somalia, 444 (25.2 percent) who served in the Balkans,
and 679 (38.6 percent) veterans of the Gulf War.
Focus Groups
To explore issues raised by the survey, we convened four focus groups—one each for
the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—at the Naval War College between 24
September and 1 October 2001. Each focus group consisted of 11–12 O-4 and O-5
officers drawn from the student body of the College of Naval Command and Staff and
the College of Naval Warfare. They were representative of their services’ combat and
combat support career fields.
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RANK NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
O-3 8 0.4
O-4 1354 71.9
O-5 359 19.1
O-6 111 5.9
O-7 19 1.0
O-8 31 1.6
O-9 1 —
TABLE 4
Respondents’ Rank.
0
100
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FIGURE 2
Maximum Retirement Age of Respondents.
Focus group participants filled out an abbreviated survey instrument. We then con-
ducted a roundtable discussion of the questions in the instrument. The focus group in-
strument is presented as Appendix B.
Literature Review
To assess trends in officer attitudes over time, we analyzed articles on innovation,
transformation, the impact of the information revolution on warfare, and the military
exploitation of new technologies published in professional military journals from
1990–2000—the decade leading up to the officer attitude survey conducted as the first
part of the project.
We selected eight journals for analysis. These represent the primary venues for the
transmission of ideas by and for the officer corps of all four armed services.
• Military Review is a bimonthly publication prepared by the U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College as “the professional journal of the U.S. Army.”
• Joint Force Quarterly is a quarterly publication “published for the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National
Defense University.”
• Proceedings is a monthly publication of the U.S. Naval Institute—an “independent
forum for the sea services.”
• Aerospace Power Journal is produced quarterly as “the professional flagship
publication of the United States Air Force.”
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SERVICE
NUMBER OF
RESPONDENTS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
U.S. Army* 900 46.9
U.S. Air Force* 472 24.6
U.S. Navy* 249 13.0
U.S. Marine Corps* 79 4.1
International Officers 104 5.4
Civilians 54 2.8
Army National Guard 39 2.0
U.S. Coast Guard 7 —
Air National Guard 15 —
TABLE 5
Responses by Service.
* Includes reserve component.
• The Marine Corps Association publishes the Marine Corps Gazette as “the
professional journal of the U.S. Marine Corps.”
• Parameters is produced quarterly as “an official US Army periodical published by
the US Army War College.”
• Naval War College Review is published quarterly by the U.S. Naval War College as “a
forum for discussion of public policy matters of interest to the maritime services.”
• Strategic Review is a quarterly publication of the United States Strategic Institute in
association with the Center for International Relations, Boston University.
We reviewed every issue of each of the eight journals for the 11-year period. A total of
five individuals—four military and one civilian—were involved in the process. The ref-
erences for each of the articles were cross-checked against the list to ensure the inclu-
sion of nearly every relevant work that had been published during the time frame of
the study. During the review process, about 5 percent of the initial articles were dis-
carded as not being relevant, and about an equal number were added as having missed
the first cut. A total of 345 articles were identified as meeting the survey criteria and
analyzed for content. We also collected data on the principal author of each article, in-
cluding their affiliation (military, civilian, retired, or military reserve), country of citi-
zenship, military rank, and service.30
Analysis of the content of the articles was intended to mirror, to the extent possible, the
survey of officer attitudes conducted in 2000. Each article was assessed in terms of
three perspectives:
• Attitude. The attitude of the article was considered Positive if the author concluded
that major change in warfare (e.g., the RMA) is attainable and will undoubtedly favor
the United States. It was considered Ambivalent if the author concluded that it was too
early to determine the outcome of such change. The attitude was considered Skeptical
if the author concluded that major change is unwise, unattainable, or irrelevant.
• Imperative. The primary catalyst for change was considered to be Threat if the
author concluded that the United States must take action to avoid an unacceptable
risk or penalty posed by major changes in warfare in the coming decades. It was
considered to be Opportunity if the author felt that change would provide the
United States significant future military advantages over an opponent. The
imperative was considered Both if the author concluded that future change offered
the prospect of both threat and opportunity.
• Call for Action. Articles were differentiated as to whether the author concluded that
Action is needed to achieve the desired technology-based future, or whether he felt
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that such change is Inevitable (although may be attained sooner if the United States
acts to speed the process).
Finally, the appearance of the specific terms “revolution,” “innovation,” and “transforma-
tion” was recorded in order to track trends in terminology in the post-Cold War decade.
Several caveats are in order. Analysis of articles appearing in military professional jour-
nals, even over a period of more than a decade, is far less definitive than a direct officer
attitude survey and may offer only limited insight into dominant trends in professional
thinking. In the first place, the authors were self-selecting. Even among those officers
having worthwhile ideas with respect to the future of warfare, the articles only reflected
those who could communicate effectively in writing and who chose to devote their
own time to the task of having their ideas published. For the most part, they can be
considered to be individuals with very strong opinions on the subject. An interesting
feature of the officer attitude survey conducted in 2000 was the extent to which most
opinions were clustered in the middle of the response range, reflecting a good deal of
uncertainty among most officers with respect to the issues. Although we did not deter-
mine which, if any, of the authors of the professional articles participated in the survey,
it would probably be safe to conclude that they would be more likely to answer at the
extremes of most of the attitude survey questions.
Another limitation is the extremely small data set that is available for analysis. During
the last six years of the literature survey period, when the majority of the articles were
published, the average number of military officers publishing on such subjects proba-
bly did not exceed 30 per year—an almost inconsequential percentage of the overall of-
ficer corps. There were undoubtedly articles on this subject submitted to the journals
that were not selected for publication. But it would seem unlikely that the number of
well-written and well-reasoned articles that went unpublished would add considerably to
the totals. Nevertheless, the editorial selection process may very well have introduced bi-
ases in publication of articles that may skew the overall analysis. For instance, the nearly
even distribution of attitudes reflected in those articles appearing in Parameters over the
11-year period is at least suggestive of an effort to offer their readers a balanced number
of opinions on the subject. Although all of the journals profess editorial independence,
only the Strategic Review has no institutional ties to the U.S. military services.
Finally, the evaluation of the articles was necessarily subjective. Unlike the officer atti-
tude survey, there is no common definition of terms in the professional literature. All
of the articles reflect a broad array of approaches and attitudes that cannot be strictly
categorized in a small set of criteria. Nevertheless, we consider the methodology em-
ployed in this study to have produced a data set as complete and objective as could rea-
sonably be expected for a project of this scope.
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Attitudes toward the Emerging RMA
We presented respondents with six statements to measure their attitudes toward the
emerging revolution in military affairs (RMA). These were designed to determine whether
officers were skeptical, ambivalent, or enthusiastic about the proposition that we are ex-
periencing an RMA, as well as how demographic variables affected their attitudes.
Statement 1: Military forces employing information-age technology, doctrine, and or-
ganizations will enjoy a substantial edge over those that do not.
Strategic analysts differ over the benefits that may accrue to the United States if it
transforms its armed forces through the widespread adoption of information-age tech-
nology, doctrine, and organizations. Joint Vision 2010 explicitly stated that the success-
ful adaptation of new technologies through the application of new operational
concepts would enable the U.S. military to “dominate an opponent across the range of
military operations.”32 RMA enthusiasts such as James R. Blaker argue that “The potency
of the American RMA stems from new military systems that will create, through their
interaction, an enormous military disparity between the United States and any oppo-
nent. Baldly stated, U.S. military forces will be able to apply military force with dramat-
ically greater efficiency than an opponent, and do so with little risk to U.S. forces.”33
Others are skeptical that information technology will give the United States a meaning-
ful—or durable—advantage.34
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1. Military forces employing information-age technology, doctrine, and organizations will enjoy a
substantial edge over those that do not.
2. The exploitation of new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts will favor the
United States over the full spectrum of potential adversaries.
3. Other states have no incentive to exploit new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts.
4. Adversaries will exploit new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts before the U.S.
can field similar capabilities.
5. New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will give adversaries an advantage
over the United States in future conflicts.
10.31 Those who believe that emerging technology will substantially alter the conduct of war are
unrealistic.
The officers we surveyed believed strongly that information-age ways of war will give the
United States considerable leverage (see fig. 1). Eighty-five percent felt that forces em-
ploying information-age technology, doctrine, and organizations would enjoy a substan-
tial edge over those that do not; only 10 percent felt they would not. The mean response
was 5.72 on a scale of 1 to 7. This represents the strongest positive response in the survey.
Air Force and Navy officers were more confident than their Army and Marine Corps
counterparts that information-age ways of war would confer a substantial battlefield
edge upon those possessing them (see table 1). While 93 percent of Navy officers and
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FIGURE 1
Military forces employing information-age technology, doctrine, and organiza-
tions will enjoy a substantial edge over those that do not.
AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 85% 5% 10%
Army 79% 6% 15%
Marine Corps 81% 5% 14%
Navy 93% 2% 5%
Air Force 92% 3% 5%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
82% 6% 12%
Senior Officers 91% 3% 6%
Flag Officers 86% 8% 6%
TABLE 1
Military forces employing information-age technology, doctrine, and organiza-
tions will enjoy a substantial edge over those that do not.
92 percent of Air Force officers agreed with the statement, only 81 percent of Marine
Corps officers and 79 percent of Army officers agreed. Similarly, senior officers were
more confident than junior officers. Ninety-one percent of senior officers agreed
with the statement, while only 82 percent of junior and field-grade officers agreed.
Whether or not an officer had served in combat did not appear to affect his attitude.
For example, 85 percent of Gulf War veterans and 83 percent of Somalia veterans
agreed with the statement.
Statement 2: The exploitation of new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts
will favor the U.S. over the full spectrum of potential adversaries.
This statement is an explicit theme of Joint Vision 2010. Moreover, RMA advocates ar-
gue that the exploitation of new ways of war will give the United States an edge across
the spectrum of conflict. William Owens has written “if we decide to accelerate the
[transformation] process by emphasizing those systems and weapons that drive the
revolution, we can reach our goals years—perhaps decades—before any other nation.” 35
Owens and Joseph Nye have argued that the emerging RMA will not only give the
United States a battlefield edge against regional powers, but will also bolster efforts to
deal with such dangers as international crime, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, and environmental damage.36 Others have argued that information-
age ways of war are likely to be irrelevant in a world dominated by ethnic hatred, terror-
ism, and transnational crime.37 As Commander William Toti put it, the:
RMA will have little impact on the kind of wars we see today. For example, RMA would
have done nothing to help us prevent the slaughter of 800,000 people in 100 days in
Rwanda. It would have done nothing to prevent a few thousand boys with rifles and
rocket-propelled grenades from overwhelming our best troops—Rangers and Deltas—
in Mogadishu. Nor would it have improved our capability to fight the kind of battle we
saw in 1995 in Bosnia, where 7,000 men were killed in 48 hours. All our improved sensors
would have allowed us to do there would have been to locate the gravesites more quickly.38
Ralph Peters, at the time a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, feared that “our post-
RMA military may prove the most expensive white elephant in the history of mankind.”39
The officers that we surveyed appear to be highly confident that the emerging RMA will
give the United States leverage over the full spectrum of potential adversaries. Seventy-
five percent agreed that new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts will give
the U.S. armed forces dominance over the full spectrum of potential adversaries; 18
percent disagreed, while 7 percent were unsure. The mean response was 5.19.
Officers’ confidence in the effectiveness of the emerging RMA is corroborated by their
lack of concern about potential threats, a subject we explore in chapter 7. However,
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discussion during the focus group sessions suggests that the positive response to this
statement might be conditional. Focus group participants expressed strong confidence
that the United States would maintain significant technological superiority over any
potential adversary. They were also uncertain as to whether the United States will have
the political and military will to acquire and exploit these technologies. This might ex-
plain why 39 percent of the survey respondents tended toward uncertainty on this is-
sue. Thus a more accurate interpretation of the responses to Statement 2 might be that
the United States will be favored if it actually chooses to exploit new technology, doc-
trine, and organizational concepts.
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 75% 7% 18%
Army 70% 10% 20%
Marine Corps 67% 9% 24%
Navy 74% 8% 18%
Air Force 80% 6% 14%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
74% 8% 18%
Senior Officers 74% 8% 18%
Flag Officers 75% 17% 8%
TABLE 2
The exploitation of new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts will
favor the U.S. over the full spectrum of potential adversaries.
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FIGURE 2
The exploitation of new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts will
favor the U.S. over the full spectrum of potential adversaries.
Air Force officers agreed most strongly with the proposition that the emerging RMA
will favor the United States over the full spectrum of adversaries; their Army and Ma-
rine Corps counterparts, by contrast, were more skeptical (see table 2). While 80 per-
cent of Air Force officers agreed with the statement, only 70 percent of Army officers
and 67 percent of Marine Corps officers agreed. The fact that ground forces are in-
volved in low-technology contingencies such as peacekeeping and humanitarian opera-
tions more often than air forces may help explain this difference. An officer’s rank did
not appear to influence his response.
Statement 3: Other states have no incentive to exploit new technology, doctrine, and or-
ganizational concepts.
Joint Vision 2010 justified the requirement of Full-Dimensional Protection as necessary
“to protect our own forces from the very technologies that we are exploiting,” thus sug-
gesting not only an incentive, but a likelihood that other states would seek to compete
with us in the high technology arena.40 Many RMA critics, but also some RMA enthusi-
asts, echo this sentiment.41 They point out that most if not all of the technologies that
are central to information-age warfare are available on the open market. In addition, a
growing number of states are developing competence in information technology.42 But
other RMA enthusiasts argue that potential adversaries have no incentive to compete
with the United States in emerging warfare areas. As Joseph Nye and William Owens
have written, “There is no particular incentive for [other] nations to seek the system of
systems the United States is building—so long as they believe they are not threatened
by it.”43 As a result, they forecast a prolonged period of unchallenged U.S. dominance.
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FIGURE 3
Other states have no incentive to exploit new technology, doctrine, and organiza-
tional concepts.
The officers we surveyed disagreed strongly with the contention that other states have
no reason to exploit new technology, doctrine, and concepts. Indeed, they expressed
the overwhelming belief that potential adversaries have every motivation to compete
with the United States. Eighty-five percent agreed that adversaries have an incentive to
compete with the United States, while only eight percent disagreed and only one in five
showed any tendency toward uncertainty. The mean response was 2.07. This was one of
the strongest negative responses of the survey. However, while most officers felt that
potential adversaries will have an incentive to compete with the United States, the re-
sponses to other statements imply that they believe that adversaries will not in the end
be successful (see chapter 7).
Statement 4: Adversaries will exploit new technology, doctrine, and organizational con-
cepts before the United States can field similar capabilities.
A slim majority of officers—54 percent—agreed that the United States would retain its
lead over potential adversaries in exploiting the emerging RMA, while a significant mi-
nority—27 percent—predicted that potential adversaries would be able to exploit new
ways of war before the United States. Nearly sixty percent of the respondents tended
toward uncertainty on this issue, suggesting that a relatively large percentage of the of-
ficer corps is essentially unsure how the emerging RMA will develop and who it will fa-
vor. The mean response was 3.53.
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FIGURE 4
Adversaries will exploit new technology, doctrine, and organizational concepts
before the U.S. can field similar capabilities.
Statement 5: New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will give adver-
saries an advantage over the U.S. in future conflicts.
Joint Vision 2010 promised the achievement of Full-Dimensional Protection against a
future enemy’s efforts to exploit vulnerabilities that will arise from our exploitation of
advanced technologies. Most officers—53 percent—agreed that the emerging RMA will
not give potential foes an advantage over the United States in future conflicts. However,
a significant minority—26 percent—felt that the RMA might favor adversaries. The
mean response was 3.52. Sixty-one percent of respondents tended toward uncertainty on
this issue, reflecting perhaps a high level of uncertainty as to whether the United States
has the political and military will to both field and protect its technological advantage.
Statement 10: Those who believe that emerging technology will substantially alter the
conduct of war are unrealistic.
Some argue that it is unrealistic to expect information-age technology to yield a major
change in the conduct of war. Frederick W. Kagan, for example, has written that such a
view “is not merely wrong, it is highly dangerous. If put into practice along the lines
conceived by its proponents, it is likely to lead to embarrassments, defeats, high casual-
ties, and the loss, at least temporarily, of America’s position in the world.”44
This statement produced a bimodal response. A significant majority of officers—64
percent—were open-minded about technology-driven changes in warfare. Only 30 per-
cent felt that those who believe that emerging technology will substantially alter the
conduct of warfare are unrealistic. Forty percent tended toward uncertainty. In other
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New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will give adversaries an
advantage over the U.S. in future conflicts.
words, there is a general expectation that new technology will substantially alter the
conduct of war. Nevertheless, more than forty percent of the respondents tended to-
ward uncertainty on this issue, again reflecting a broader uncertainty about how the
emerging RMA will develop.
Air Force officers felt most strongly that those who believe that emerging technology
will substantially alter the conduct of war are realistic: only 22 percent agreed with the
statement, while 74 percent disagreed (see table 3). Similarly, only 18 percent of flag
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Those who believe that emerging technology will substantially alter the conduct
of war are unrealistic.
AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 30% 6% 64%
Army 32% 8% 60%
Navy 34% 5% 61%
Marine Corps 48% 5% 47%
Air Force 22% 4% 74%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
30% 7% 63%
Senior Officers 30% 8% 62%
Flag Officers 18% 2% 80%
TABLE 3
Those who believe that emerging technology will substantially alter the conduct
of war are unrealistic.
officers agreed with the statement, while 80 percent disagreed. Marine Corps officers,
by contrast, felt most strongly that those who believe that emerging technology will
substantially alter the conduct of war are unrealistic: 47 percent disagreed with the
statement, while 48 percent agreed with it.
Summary
The survey revealed abstract enthusiasm among officers for the proposition that we are
experiencing an RMA, albeit heavily tinged with uncertainty. Most officers we surveyed
believed that the emerging RMA would give the United States considerable leverage over
potential adversaries. They felt that it would favor the United States over the full spec-
trum of potential adversaries. They also believed that the United States will maintain
its lead. While most officers are open to change, our survey revealed significant differ-
ences among members of different services. Air Force and Navy officers tended to be
more enthusiastic about new ways of war, while Army and Marine Corps officers were
generally more skeptical. As noted above, there is a good deal of uncertainty about all
of these issues, perhaps reflecting both uncertainty as to how the RMA may develop,
and some skepticism as to whether the United States will have the political and military
will to actually exploit its continuing technological advantage.
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Impact of the Emerging RMA on
Dominant Weapons
To a large extent, today’s armed forces resemble those that fought and won World War II.
Manned aircraft dominate war in the air, while on land the main battle tank is the king
of the battlefield. The aircraft carrier remains the capital ship. Joint Vision 2010, “the
conceptual template for how America’s Armed Forces will . . . leverage technological
opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting,” featured
prominent pictures of manned strike aircraft, the M-1 main battle tank, and the
Nimitz-class aircraft carrier in presentations of the “more capable” future force.45 RMA
advocates argue, however, that the growth and diffusion of information technology
may erode the dominance of such weapon systems in favor of new ways of war.46 Some
believe, for example, that over the next several decades unmanned systems could domi-
nate air warfare, ground combat could become highly distributed and non-linear,
many naval combatants could be driven underwater, and space and the information
spectrum could emerge as increasingly important domains of military conflict.47
We presented respondents with four statements to measure their attitudes toward the
impact of the emerging revolution in military affairs (RMA) on today’s dominant plat-
forms. We were interested in learning how they felt the importance of current systems
might change over the next two decades.
Statement 7: Armored and mechanized formations will be as important in 2020 as they
are today.
Armored and mechanized formations have dominated the U.S. Army since World War
II. Some have argued, however, that their utility is declining. In particular, they argue
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7. Armored and mechanized formations will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
8. Manned aircraft will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
20. Within the next 20 years, uninhabited combat aerial vehicles will become the predominant
means of conducting strike warfare.
9. Carrier Battle Groups will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
that heavy armored formations are poorly suited to humanitarian and urban opera-
tions.48 Moreover, in recent years the Army has begun to transform itself from a
tank-heavy force designed to protect Western Europe to one that is more versatile, mo-
bile and lethal. In October 1999 the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, an-
nounced a goal of transforming the Army into a medium-weight force capable of
deploying a 5,000-man combat brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a divi-
sion in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days.49 He designated two brigades at Fort
Lewis, Washington, as testbeds to explore new concepts and organizations. These units
have traded in their tracked M1A1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles for
lighter vehicles. They are also examining innovative tactics and organizations. Begin-
ning in 2012, the Army plans to begin replacing its 70-ton M1A1 Abrams main battle
tanks with the 20-ton Future Combat System (FCS), a network of light vehicles—possi-
bly including unmanned systems.50 Some have argued for even more radical changes,
including the development of ground forces that are dramatically smaller and stealth-
ier, with most of their combat power exported offshore.51
The officers we surveyed fell into two groups: a slim majority of the officers (51 per-
cent) who believed that armored and mechanized formations will be as important in
twenty years as they are today, and a significant minority (34 percent) who felt they
would be less important. Fifteen percent were unsure (see figure 1). However, 53 per-
cent of respondents fell into the middle categories of 3, 4, and 5, reflecting considerable
uncertainty about the future of armored forces. The mean response of 4.34 reflected
this. It is worth pondering whether the effectiveness of light special operations forces in
Afghanistan during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM will affect perceptions of the
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FIGURE 1
Armored and mechanized formations will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
future importance of heavy armored forces. Army Captain Bob Krumm, for example,
has argued that the U.S. Government dispatched Marines to Afghanistan because the
Army lacked units that were light yet lethal enough for the mission. As he put it, “The
Marines are doing what needs to be done in an ever-changing world—adapting. The
Army, meanwhile, is content to build a smaller version of its former self.”52
Not surprisingly, Army officers believed in the enduring importance of armored and
mechanized formations more strongly than did their counterparts in other services
(see table 1 and figure 2). Fifty-six percent of Army officers believed that armored and
mechanized formations would be as important in 2020 as they are today. Navy and
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 51% 15% 34%
Army 56% 15% 29%
Marine Corps 53% 16% 31%
Navy 54% 19% 27%
Air Force 40% 16% 44%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
54% 15% 31%
Senior Officers 43% 17% 40%
Flag Officers 39% 20% 41%
TABLE 1
Armored and mechanized formations will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
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FIGURE 2
Armored and mechanized formations will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
Marine Corps officers were only slightly less confident in the future importance of ar-
mor. Only 40 percent of Air Force officers, by contrast, believed that armored and
mechanized formations would continue to be as important as they are today.
Not surprisingly, armor branch Army officers believed strongly in the enduring impor-
tance of armored forces (see figure 3). Indeed, 72 percent of armor officers felt that ar-
mored and mechanized formations would be as important in 2020 as they are today.
Such results corroborate anecdotal evidence of opposition from active-duty and retired
armor officers to General Shinseki’s attempts to replace armored and mechanized divi-
sions with medium-weight units.53
Statement 8: Manned aircraft will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
Some RMA advocates have argued that air power will increasingly feature the use of un-
manned systems, a trend that may challenge the Air Force’s institutional culture and
warrior ethos.54 UAVs have seen extensive use in all military operations since the 1991
Gulf War. Some have recommended cutting manned aircraft—particularly tactical
fighter forces—in favor of greater investment in UAVs and UCAVs, stealthy long-range
cargo aircraft, advanced precision-guided munitions, and satellites.55
The officers we surveyed split into two distinct groups: 58 percent believed that
manned aircraft will be as important in 2020 as they are today, while 35 percent felt
they would be less important. Nine percent were unsure. As with the previous state-
ment, however, a much larger percentage—48 percent in this case—tended toward un-
certainty. This was reflected in the mean response of 4.55.
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Armored and mechanized formations will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
While Army officers had the greatest confidence in the future of armored and mecha-
nized formations, surprisingly, Air Force officers had the least faith in the continued
importance of manned aircraft. Only 43 percent of Air Force officers felt that manned
aircraft would be as important in 2020 as today (see table 2). By contrast, 66 percent of
Marine Corps, 61 percent of Army, and 57 percent of Navy officers believed in the en-
during value of manned aircraft. The focus groups shed additional light upon these re-
sults. It appears that an officer’s attitude toward the future importance of manned
aircraft depends upon which types of aircraft he feels are most important. While many
Air Force and Navy officers who participated in the focus groups equated manned air-
craft with reconnaissance and strike missions, Army and Marine Corps officers tended
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 58% 9% 33%
Army 61% 11% 27%
Marine Corps 66% 6% 28%
Navy 57% 7% 36%
Air Force 43% 7% 50%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
58% 11% 31%
Senior Officers 56% 8% 36%
Flag Officers 55% 16% 29%
TABLE 2
Manned aircraft will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
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FIGURE 4
Manned aircraft will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
to think about transport and close air support—missions that are likely to require a
human operator for the foreseeable future.
Not surprisingly, aviators had greater confidence in the future importance of manned
aircraft than the general population. Sixty-five percent of the aviators in the survey
population believed that manned aircraft would be as important in twenty years as
they are today; only 29 percent believed they would be less important. An officer’s
combat experience did not appear to affect his attitude. Sixty-three percent of Gulf
War and 57 percent of Somalia veterans believed in the continuing importance of
manned aircraft; Haiti and Balkans veterans held similar views.
Statement 20: Within the next 20 years, uninhabited combat aerial vehicles will become
the predominant means of conducting strike warfare.
Recent years have seen the increasing use of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) for recon-
naissance and surveillance. The Air Force operates squadrons of RQ-1 Predator me-
dium altitude and endurance UAVs. It is also acquiring the RQ-4 Global Hawk
high-altitude, long-endurance UAV. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps use UAVs for re-
connaissance and surveillance. They are also developing more advanced designs, in-
cluding man-portable micro-UAVs for tactical reconnaissance and vertical-takeoff
systems. The services are also exploring the use of uninhabited combat aerial vehicles
(UCAVs) to suppress enemy air defenses and launch strikes. The Air Force is examining
the X-45A UCAV, an aircraft designed to fly as high as 40,000 feet, have a 1,000-mile
range, and carry 12 miniature bombs. It has also launched Hellfire anti-tank guided
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Within the next 20 years, uninhabited combat aerial vehicles will become the pre-
dominant means of conducting strike warfare.
missiles from the Predator. RMA advocates argue that such vehicles will play an increas-
ingly important role in future operations. 56
Forty-six percent of the officers we surveyed felt that UCAVs would become the pre-
dominant means of conducting strike warfare within the next twenty years. Thirty-six
percent disagreed, and 18 percent were unsure. However, 61 percent of respondents
tended toward uncertainty, indicating that most officers really don’t know what to
think about this possible development. This was reflected in the mean response of 4.18.
The highly touted use of UCAVs for strike missions in operations after the survey was
conducted may change this view.
Air Force officers were the most enthusiastic about UCAVs. Fifty-three percent of Air
Force officers believed that UCAVs would become the predominant means of conduct-
ing strike warfare within the next twenty years (see table 3). By contrast, only 42 per-
cent of Army officers and 43 percent of Marine Corps officers held the same view.
Our focus groups indicated that an officer’s assumptions about the rate of technologi-
cal development and cultural acceptance of unmanned systems conditioned his re-
sponse. There was a general consensus that UAVs were increasingly important,
particularly for reconnaissance and surveillance missions. Officers differed, however, as
to whether it would be feasible for unmanned systems to perform strike missions reli-
ably within the next twenty years. Their assessments of the rate at which the culture of
the services would change to accept unmanned strike systems also diverged. These fo-
cus group findings likely explain much of the high degree of uncertainty that sur-
rounds this issue.
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 46% 18% 36%
Army 42% 21% 37%
Marine Corps 43% 11% 46%
Navy 47% 14% 39%
Air Force 53% 13% 34%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
47% 20% 33%
Senior Officers 47% 13% 40%
Flag Officers 43% 24% 33%
TABLE 3
Within the next 20 years, uninhabited combat aerial vehicles will become the pre-
dominant means of conducting strike warfare.
Statement 9: Carrier Battle Groups will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
RMA advocates have predicted that carrier battle groups may decline in importance
over time. Andrew Krepinevich, for example, has argued that aircraft carriers are of de-
creasing utility due to their high cost and growing vulnerability, and because of the in-
creasing availability of substitutes for carrier air power for presence and power
projection.57 He has argued that the Navy should reduce its carrier force while increas-
ing its investment in concepts such as the “arsenal ship” and cruise missile carrying
submarines.58 Some envision the capital ship of the future to be a submersible vessel
armed with large numbers of cruise and ballistic missiles.59
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FIGURE 6
Carrier Battle Groups will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 68% 11% 21%
Army 68% 12% 20%
Marine Corps 71% 7% 22%
Navy 80% 7% 13%
Air Force 63% 10% 27%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
69% 12% 19%
Senior Officers 64% 9% 27%
Flag Officers 63% 17% 20%
TABLE 4
Carrier Battle Groups will be as important in 2020 as they are today.
The responses to this statement exhibited a bimodal distribution, though skewed consid-
erably to the right. Sixty-eight percent of the officers we surveyed believe that carrier bat-
tle groups will be as important in twenty years as they are today; 21 percent believe they
will be less important and 11 percent were unsure. Forty-six percent of the respondents
tended toward uncertainty on this issue, compared with nearly seven in ten in agreement,
indicating much more confidence in the continued viability of the carrier battle group
than with manned aircraft and armored formations. The mean response was 4.95.
Navy officers were the most enthusiastic about the future of carrier battle groups, with
80 percent arguing that carrier battle groups would be as important in 2020 as they are
today (see table 4). The prominent role of carrier-based tactical aircraft in major mili-
tary operations since this survey was conducted may reinforce this view. Air Force offi-
cers were most skeptical. But even among Air Force officers, 63 percent believed in the
enduring importance of carrier battle groups.
Officers who participated in our focus groups argued that carrier battle groups would
continue to be important because they perform valuable roles such as presence. The
statement did not stipulate that the carrier battle group mission would not change in
the future, but focus group participants generally understood that to be implied. A
number of officers observed that the United States would still have a large number of
Nimitz-class aircraft carriers in 2020 in any event. Others, however, noted that they
represent lucrative targets and may be becoming increasingly vulnerable to long-range
targeting and attack.
Summary
The officers we surveyed believed that the emerging RMA would not reduce the utility
of today’s dominant platforms. In each case, a majority of officers felt that today’s
dominant systems would be as important in 2020 as they are today. However, a large
percentage of respondents tended toward uncertainty in each case as well. In addition,
we detected significant differences in attitudes among officers from different services.
Army officers tended to be the most enthusiastic about current systems. This included
not only armored and mechanized formations, but also manned aircraft and carrier
battle groups. Air Force officers, by contrast, were most willing to contemplate change,
even if it involved devaluing manned aircraft. An officer’s rank also appeared to influ-
ence his attitudes. In each case, the higher an officer’s rank, the less enthusiastic and
more uncertain he was likely to be about the continued importance of today’s dominant
systems. By contrast, an officer’s combat experience did not appear to affect his attitudes.
It should also be noted that the extent to which the officers surveyed were cognizant of
technological developments and proposals for change to today’s dominant weapons is
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not clear. The focus groups indicated that most officers do not stay abreast of such de-
velopments outside of their narrow tactical-technical specialties, and therefore might
not be sensitized to the prospect for major change. This lack of information may ex-
plain the high degree of uncertainty evidenced in the responses to these statements.
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Emergence of New Ways of War
Many of those who argue that we are in the midst of a revolution in military affairs
predict that the information revolution will not only change war on land, at sea, and in
the air, but also that it will bring war into space and cyberspace. Such a view is implicit
in Joint Vision 2010. We presented the respondents with four statements intended to as-
sess their perceptions of the emergence of these domains as important venues for mili-
tary operations.
Statement 17: Within the next 20 years, conflicts will include combat operations in or
from space.
Space systems have for decades supported terrestrial military operations. Ground, sea,
and air forces have relied upon satellites for reconnaissance and surveillance, commu-
nications, weather prediction, and navigation. Military and civilian experts alike have
long discussed the possibility of conducting combat operations in and from space.
Combat operations in space could include ballistic missile defense and antisatellite
warfare. Those conducted from space could include strikes launched from space on ter-
restrial targets. However, a number of arms control agreements currently constrain the
deployment and employment of weapons in space. Some argue that the deployment of
weapons in space would provoke an arms race that would ultimately hurt the United
States the most because we rely upon space the most. In addition, there are those who
question the maturity of space weapon technology.
RMA advocates have argued that space is likely to play an increasingly important role in
future conflicts. Indeed, some predict that it may be considered an independent theater
of military operations.60 Russian analysts have forecast that future conflicts will be
characterized by the dominance of aerospace and information warfare over traditional
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17. Within the next 20 years, conflicts will include combat operations in or from space.
18. Within the next 20 years, attacks upon computer networks will become a central feature of
military operations.
6. Information systems and networks are highly vulnerable to enemy countermeasures.
22d. Future adversaries will be able to deny the U.S. the use of information networks.
ground combat.61 Chinese military authors have accorded increased attention to com-
bat in space as well.62 The report of the 1997 National Defense Panel cited the possibil-
ity that future adversaries may challenge the United States’ control of space.63 Similarly,
the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review argued that:
Space and information operations have become the backbone of networked, highly
distributed commercial civilian and military capabilities. This opens up the possibility
that space control—the exploitation of space and the denial of the use of space to ad-
versaries—will become a key objective in future military competition.64
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FIGURE 1
Within the next 20 years, conflicts will include combat operations in or from space.
AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 76% 10% 14%
Army 77% 11% 12%
Marine Corps 78% 7% 15%
Navy 71% 13% 16%
Air Force 76% 9% 15%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
76% 11% 13%
Senior Officers 76% 7% 17%
Flag Officers 80% 10% 10%
International Officers 71% 11% 18%
U.S. Officers 76% 10% 14%
TABLE 1
Within the next 20 years, conflicts will include combat operations in or from space.
The report also identified increasing the capability and survivability of space systems
and their support infrastructure as a key objective.65
More than three-quarters of the officers that we surveyed believed that within the next
twenty years conflicts will include combat operations in or from space; only 14 percent
disagreed, and 10 percent were unsure (see figure 1). While 48 percent of respondents
tended toward uncertainty, the mean response of 5.16 shows at least some level of
agreement. This view held among officers of all services and ranks (see table 1). Inter-
national officers were slightly less confident than their American counterparts that fu-
ture wars will include combat operations in or from space. Still, more than seven out of
ten agreed with the proposition.
The responses of focus group participants shed additional light upon these responses.
Many viewed combat operations in space as inevitable, and nearly all interpreted the
statement as implying the actual movement of kill mechanisms into or out of outer
space. A number argued that potential U.S. adversaries would exploit the perceived vul-
nerability of U.S. military satellites to electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects in an attempt
to counter the U.S. advantage in space. Others believed that the United States would sta-
tion weapons in space to strike the Earth. They also acknowledged the barriers to combat
operations in space, including treaty limitations and less formal political constraints.
Statement 18: Within the next 20 years, attacks upon computer networks will become a
central feature of military operations.
The increasing use of information networks has increased their attractiveness as tar-
gets.66 The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, for example, predicted that “states will
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FIGURE 2
Within the next 20 years, attacks upon computer networks will become a central
feature of military operations.
likely develop offensive information operations and be compelled to devote resources
to protecting critical information infrastructure from disruption, either physically or
through cyber space.”67 Indeed, some argue that attacks upon information networks
may become a new form of strategic warfare.68
A large majority of officers (85 percent) believed that computer network attack will be-
come a central feature of military operations; 10 percent disagreed and 5 percent were
unsure. Only 34 percent of respondents tended toward uncertainty, compared to 48
percent of those who answered the previous statement. In other words, they seem to be
much more certain that computer network attack will be an important feature of fu-
ture conflicts than they were of combat operations in or from space.
As with the previous statement, officers of all services and ranks shared this view (see
table 2). Moreover, the response of international officers was virtually indistinguishable
from that of their American counterparts.
Statement 6: Information systems and networks are highly vulnerable to enemy
countermeasures.
A large majority (76 percent) of the officers that we surveyed believe that information
systems and networks are highly vulnerable to enemy countermeasures; 15 percent dis-
agreed and 9 percent were unsure. While 46 percent of respondents tended toward un-
certainty, the mean response of 5.26 shows considerable support for the proposition.
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 85% 5% 10%
Army 82% 7% 11%
Marine Corps 86% 4% 10%
Navy 86% 3% 11%
Air Force 88% 4% 8%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
85% 5% 10%
Senior Officers 85% 6% 9%
Flag Officers 90% 4% 6%
International Officers 84% 7% 9%
U.S. Officers 85% 5% 10%
TABLE 2
Within the next 20 years, attacks upon computer networks will become a central
feature of military operations.
There was a consensus among officers of all services and ranks that information sys-
tems and networks are highly vulnerable (see table 3). International officers expressed
both a higher level of confidence in the resistance of networks to countermeasures and
a higher level of uncertainty than their American counterparts.
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Information systems and networks are highly vulnerable to enemy counter-
measures.
AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 76% 9% 15%
Army 74% 11% 15%
Marine Corps 77% 7% 16%
Navy 75% 11% 14%
Air Force 79% 8% 13%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
76% 10% 14%
Senior Officers 74% 11% 15%
Flag Officers 70% 10% 20%
International Officers 67% 22% 11%
U.S. Officers 76% 9% 15%
TABLE 3
Information systems and networks are highly vulnerable to enemy counter-
measures.
Statement 22d: Future adversaries will be able to deny the U.S. the use of information
networks.
Despite the fact that a large majority of officers felt that computer network attack was
becoming a central feature of warfare and a strong belief that information networks are
vulnerable to enemy countermeasures, 78 percent of the officers that we surveyed
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Future adversaries will be able to deny the U.S. the use of information networks.
AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 15% 7% 78%
Army 12% 9% 79%
Marine Corps 16% 5% 79%
Navy 14% 6% 80%
Air Force 14% 7% 79%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
13% 7% 80%
Senior Officers 20% 7% 73%
Flag Officers 18% 6% 76%
International Officers 45% 9% 46%
U.S. Officers 15% 7% 78%
TABLE 4
Future adversaries will be able to deny the U.S. the use of information networks.
argued that future adversaries will not be able to deny the United States the use of in-
formation networks. Only 15 percent believed that adversaries would be able to deny
us the use of information networks, and 7 percent were unsure. This result, which is
somewhat surprising, appears to indicate that officers believe that the United States
will be able to overcome any challenges that it will face. Such confidence is reflected in
responses to other survey statements exploring potential threats to U.S. forces (see
chapter 7), and was essentially confirmed by the focus groups.
Officers of all services expressed confidence that future adversaries will be unable to
deny the United States the use of its information networks (see table 4). Of note is the
fact that senior and flag officers were more concerned than junior officers, perhaps be-
cause they possessed a greater understanding of the information warfare threat. Most
significantly, however, international officers felt much more strongly than their Ameri-
can counterparts in the ability of future adversaries to disrupt U.S. information net-
works. While only 15 percent of American officers agreed with the statement, 45
percent of international officers agreed.
Summary
The survey revealed a consensus among officers of all services and ranks that military
operations in space and cyberspace will play an increasingly important role in warfare.
It also revealed a consensus that information systems and networks are highly vulnera-
ble to enemy countermeasures. However, only 15 percent of the U.S. officers we sur-
veyed believed that future adversaries will be able to deny the United States the use of
information networks in future conflict. International officers were much more con-
cerned about the threat. Officers were more certain of their responses to this group of
statements than most others. In none of the statements did more than half of the re-
spondents tend toward uncertainty.
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Impact of the Emerging RMA on the
Character of War
We presented the respondents with nine statements that were intended to assess their gen-
eral perceptions of how the emerging RMA might change the character of future conflicts.
Statement 11: The ability to strike an adversary with precision from a distance will di-
minish the need for the U.S. to field ground forces.
Some proponents of the emerging RMA argue that the ability to strike an enemy with
standoff weaponry may eliminate many requirements to engage enemy forces with
ground troops. Official publications of the mid-1990s tended to support this position.
Joint Vision 2010 predicted that “we will be increasingly able to accomplish the effects
of mass . . . with less need to mass forces physically than in the past” while cautioning
that “this will not obviate the need for ‘boots on the ground’ in many operations [em-
phasis added].”69 The implication, intended or not, is that there will be no need for
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11. The ability to strike an adversary with precision from a distance will diminish the need for the
U.S. to field ground forces.
16. Within the next 20 years, sensor and command and control technology will allow the U.S.
armed forces to locate, track, and destroy enemy forces within a limited geographic area,
regardless of enemy countermeasures.
19. Within the next 20 years, the continued incorporation of conventional precision-guided
munitions into U.S. forces will permit deep reductions in the U.S. nuclear stockpile.
24a. New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will offer the ability to engage in
high-intensity operations with substantially reduced risk of U.S. casualties.
24b. New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will substantially reduce the duration
of future conflicts.
24c. New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for the U.S. to use
force.
24d. New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for the U.S. to
achieve decisive battlefield victories.
24e. New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase the importance of my
service relative to the other services.
24f. New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase the importance of my
branch relative to others in my service.
“boots on the ground” in many—if not most—instances in the future. James R. Blaker is
representative of a number of authors who predict that the RMA will alter the traditional
relationship between fire and maneuver. In Blaker’s view, “indirect fire—delivered largely
from non-organic sources—[would become] the primary means of destroying the oppo-
nent, while maneuver would be seen as essentially the means of directing fire.”70
The officers we surveyed strongly disagreed with the contention that long-range preci-
sion strike would diminish the need for the United States to field ground forces (see
figure 1). More than 70 percent disagreed with the statement, and more than half (51
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FIGURE 1
The ability to strike an adversary with precision from a distance will diminish the
need for the U.S. to field ground forces.
AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 26% 4% 70%
Army 19% 4% 77%
Marine Corps 9% 1% 90%
Navy 21% 1% 78%
Air Force 42% 6% 52%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
25% 5% 70%
Senior Officers 26% 5% 69%
Flag Officers 35% 2% 63%
TABLE 1
The ability to strike an adversary with precision from a distance will diminish the
need for the U.S. to field ground forces.
percent) leaned toward strong disagreement. Indeed, this statement garnered one of
the strongest negative responses in the survey, as reflected in the mean response of 2.92.
As might be expected, Marine Corps and Army officers were strongly opposed to the
proposition that striking an adversary with precision from a distance will diminish the
need to field ground forces; Air Force officers made up the largest proportion of those
who tended toward a positive view of this statement (see table 1). Of note is the fact
that the survey was conducted shortly after U.S. operations in Kosovo. Ground officers
may have interpreted the outcome of that conflict as a clear indication of the need for
boots on the ground, and air officers may have interpreted it as ultimately a vindica-
tion of standoff strike.
Statement 16: Within the next 20 years, sensor and command and control technology
will allow the U.S. armed forces to locate, track, and destroy enemy forces within a lim-
ited geographic area, regardless of enemy countermeasures.
Virtually all advocates of the RMA argue that great advances in the ability to detect,
identify, and track enemy forces on the battlefield will place those enemy forces at in-
creased risk of attack. Joint Vision 2010 predicted an enhanced detectability of both en-
emy and friendly forces that would render the battle space “considerably more
transparent.”71 Admiral William Owens (retired), former Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, is one of the primary proponents of the idea of “dominant battlespace
knowledge” and has predicted an ability to detect all activity of military interest in an
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Within the next 20 years, sensor and command and control technology will allow
the U.S. armed forces to locate, track, and destroy enemy forces within a limited
geographic area, regardless of enemy countermeasures.
area as large as 200 by 200 nautical miles.72 Critics argue that promises of dominant
battlespace knowledge are illusory.73
Fifty-two percent of the officers surveyed agreed with this position (see figure 2). How-
ever, responses also reflected a bimodal distribution with 35 percent in disagreement
and 61 percent tending toward uncertainty. The mean response of 4.23 reflected this
uncertainty. This may reflect the perception of a tremendous challenge in moving from
current surveillance capabilities to a battle space that is effectively “transparent.” It also
may suggest considerable uncertainty with respect to prospective enemy capabilities to
deny U.S. forces targeting information.
Again, the survey was conducted just after U.S. operations in Kosovo, which may have
influenced many opinions about the current challenges of identifying and targeting
dispersed forces on the ground (see table 2). Air Force officers were most enthusiastic
about the ability of the United States to achieve dominant battle space knowledge,
while Marine Corps officers were most skeptical. In addition, enthusiasm increased
with an officer’s rank.
Statement 19: Within the next 20 years, the continued incorporation of conventional
precision-guided munitions into U.S. forces will permit deep reductions in the U.S.
nuclear stockpile.
Many RMA advocates predict an increasing ability to achieve “strategic effects” with
conventional weapons. Perhaps foremost among these is John Warden, who has opined
that modern standoff munitions will provide the ability to strike directly at the enemy’s
strategic center of gravity while depriving him of the ability to respond. In his view,
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 52% 13% 35%
Army 51% 15% 34%
Marine Corps 35% 6% 59%
Navy 47% 11% 42%
Air Force 56% 11% 33%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers 51% 15% 34%
Senior Officers 53% 11% 36%
Flag Officers 55% 10% 35%
TABLE 2
Within the next 20 years, sensor and command and control technology will allow
the U.S. armed forces to locate, track, and destroy enemy forces within a limited
geographic area, regardless of enemy countermeasures.
this capability for “parallel attack” can “render the enemy impotent” by imposing “stra-
tegic paralysis” on the enemy state, and make a rational enemy leadership prone to
concessions.74 Others, such as Seth Cropsey, have gone on to predict that conventional
cruise missiles alone can “decimate an enemy’s military, providing an effective deter-
rent against or meaningful punishment for a smaller nation’s use of nuclear force.”75
The implication is that advanced conventional weaponry can take on both the deter-
rence and warfighting missions of nuclear weapons, and thus reductions in the U.S.
nuclear stockpile might not be imprudent.
Others go farther. Andrew Krepinevich and Stephen Kosiak, for example, have argued
that smarter conventional bombs will mean fewer nuclear weapons. This is so, they as-
sert, because advanced technology offers the military “the ability to locate, identify, and
track a far greater number of targets over a far greater area for far longer periods of
time and to engage those targets with far greater lethality, precision, and discrimina-
tion than has ever before been possible.”76 This will, in their view, allow the United
States to reduce substantially its nuclear arsenal. Others have noted that the ability of
precision-guided munitions to substitute for nuclear weapons is limited.77
Forty-two percent of the officers surveyed agreed with the statement, but more than
one-third (35 percent) tended to disagree (see figure 3). Perhaps most interesting is
that nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of the officers surveyed tended toward uncertainty
on this issue. The mean response of 4.05 corroborates this view. Strategic nuclear suffi-
ciency was not a major topic of discussion or consideration by the broad officer
T H E L I M I T S O F T R A N S F O R M A T I O N 4 9
126
445434
270
83
224
320
0
250
500
750
1000
7654321
Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree
FIGURE 3
Within the next 20 years, the continued incorporation of conventional precision-
guided munitions into U.S. forces will permit deep reductions in the U.S. nuclear
stockpile.
population during the 1990s. The uncertainty of the respondents may reflect the fact
that most had simply never thought about the issue.
Statement 24a: New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will offer the
ability to engage in high-intensity operations with substantially reduced risk of U.S.
casualties.
The idea that the American public has developed a low tolerance for combat casualties,
whether true or not, has become an axiom of the post–Cold War military mindset.
Joint Vision 2010 states that “the American people will continue to expect us to win any
engagement, but they will also expect us to be more efficient in protecting lives and re-
sources,” and that “commanders will be expected to reduce the costs and adverse effects
of military operations.”78 Joseph Nye and William Owens opined that the risk of casual-
ties must be kept “low enough to maintain the American public’s support for the use
of force.”79 Among the explicit goals of the Joint Vision 2010 force is a reduction in risk
to U.S. troops by making it more difficult for them to be found and attacked, and by
providing them “Full-Dimensional Protection” through multi-layered defense.80
Nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of the officers surveyed agreed that the attributes of the
RMA force will allow the U.S. to engage in high-intensity combat operations with sub-
stantially reduced risk of casualties (see figure 4). The mean response was 4.59. It is not
clear whether this positive response reflects a true belief that reduced risk will be pro-
vided by the future RMA force, or the conviction that future commanders and the
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FIGURE 4
New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will offer the ability to
engage in high-intensity operations with substantially reduced risk of U.S.
casualties.
American people will simply find anything else unacceptable. In addition, the context
within which this statement was interpreted is not known. Compared with earlier wars,
the U.S. suffered relatively few casualties in the conflicts of the 1990s. It is not known if
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 63% 9% 28%
Army 52% 12% 36%
Marine Corps 59% 8% 32%
Navy 69% 8% 23%
Air Force 74% 7% 19%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
59% 11% 30%
Senior Officers 69% 10% 21%
Flag Officers 71% 5% 24%
International Officers 80% 12% 8%
U.S. Officers 62% 9% 29%
TABLE 3
New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will offer the ability to
engage in high-intensity operations with substantially reduced risk of U.S.
casualties.
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New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will offer the ability to
engage in high-intensity operations with substantially reduced risk of U.S.
casualties.
the average officer was thinking of Vietnam, or Desert Storm, or Kosovo as the bench-
mark when considering the term “substantially reduced.” All of these unknowns are
likely reflected in the fact that more than half of the officers (57 percent) tended to-
ward uncertainty in their response to this statement.
While in substantial agreement, Army officers tended to be least positive about this
statement in each response category. Air Force and Navy officers were considerably
more positive (see table 3). In addition, the proportion of officers agreeing with the
statement increased with the rank of the respondents. Most interesting was the dispro-
portionately positive response of international officers to this statement (see figure 5).
Indeed, while 62 percent of U.S. officers agreed with the statement, more than 80 per-
cent of foreign officers agreed. At face value this reflects the foreign belief that the fu-
ture U.S. force will face substantially reduced battlefield casualties. However, it also
may reflect a general foreign perception of reduced U.S. tolerance for combat losses
based upon the seeming unwillingness of the United States to commit ground forces to
recent conflicts.
Statement 24b: New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will substan-
tially reduce the duration of future conflicts.
Joint Vision 2010 forecast that the future force will enable “a more rapid transition
from deployment to full operational capability” as well as an ability to more rapidly
achie ve militar y objec tives. 81 John Warden’s v ision of moder n war fare includes the
“near-simultaneous attack on every strategic- and operational-level vulnerability of the
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FIGURE 6
New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will substantially
reduce the duration of future conflicts.
enemy” leading to his rapid collapse.82 Increased speed of command and execution are
also key features of Network Centric Warfare, which predicts the ability to rapidly
“lock out” the enemy’s strategic options and leave him “no viable courses of action.”83
Forty-nine percent of the officers agreed with the notion that exploitation of advanced
technology would substantially reduce the duration of future conflicts, while 32 per-
cent disagreed (see figure 6.) As with the previous statement, Marine Corps and Army
officers were more skeptical than their Air Force counterparts, while flag officers
tended to be more enthusiastic than junior, field-grade, or senior officers.
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 49% 17% 32%
Army 46% 19% 33%
Marine Corps 44% 11% 42%
Navy 49% 12% 37%
Air Force 54% 15% 28%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
49% 17% 32%
Senior Officers 48% 17% 32%
Flag Officers 65% 14% 20%
TABLE 4
New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will substantially
reduce the duration of future conflicts.
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New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for
the U.S. to use force.
Statement 24c: New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it
easier for the U.S. to use force.
There were few explicit arguments in the professional literature of the 1990s that the
exploitation of advanced technologies would make it easier for the United States to use
military force. However, highly touted forecasts of the U.S. military being able to more
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 63% 13% 24%
Army 57% 15% 28%
Marine Corps 59% 13% 28%
Navy 63% 13% 24%
Air Force 69% 12% 19%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
59% 16% 25%
Senior Officers 69% 11% 20%
Flag Officers 67% 15% 18%
International Officers 74% 12% 14%
U.S. Officers 62% 13% 25%
TABLE 5
New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for
the U.S. to use force.
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New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for
the U.S. to use force.
rapidly project power, and then more rapidly achieve a strategic victory, tended to im-
ply that the use of military force might become an increasingly attractive option.
Nearly two-thirds of the officers surveyed (63 percent) agreed with the statement,
while 24 percent disagreed (see figure 7). Nevertheless, more than half (56 percent)
tended toward uncertainty, as reflected in the mean response of 4.65. It is not known
whether the respondents believed that the perceived ease of using force would be more
beneficial to the United States and the attainment of its strategic objectives.
Higher percentages of Army and Marine Corps officers disagreed with the statement,
while higher percentages of Navy and Air Force officers agreed (see table 5). This prob-
ably reflects some level of differing confidence in the future capabilities of air power.
Senior and flag officers agreed with the proposition more than junior officers. Most in-
teresting was the disproportionately positive response of international officers to this
statement (see figure 8). While 62 percent of the U.S. officers agreed with the proposi-
tion, 74 percent of the international officers agreed. It is not known whether they see an
increasing ease of use of force by the U.S. translating into a more frequent use of force.
Statement 24d: New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it
easier for the U.S. to achieve decisive battlefield victories.
An explicit prediction of Joint Vision 2010 is that new technology, doctrine, and organi-
zations “will provide America with the capability to dominate an opponent across the
range of military operations.”84 Most professional literature of the 1990s that supported
pursuit of the RMA tended to imply similar beneficial results.
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New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for
the U.S. to achieve decisive battlefield victories.
More than half of the officers surveyed (60 percent) agreed with this statement (see fig-
ure 9). However a higher percentage (62 percent) of the responses tended toward un-
certainty on this issue. The mean response was 4.65. It is interesting to compare these
responses to those of Statement 24b in which most officers opined that the duration of
future conflicts would not be substantially reduced. In responding to this statement,
the officers might have been thinking of a much narrower set of high-intensity con-
flicts where the adversary would be very vulnerable to U.S. approaches that relied on
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 60% 15% 25%
Army 56% 17% 27%
Marine Corps 44% 18% 38%
Navy 57% 17% 26%
Air Force 68% 13% 19%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
60% 16% 24%
Senior Officers 59% 15% 26%
Flag Officers 73% 12% 15%
International Officers 73% 15% 12%
U.S. Officers 60% 15% 26%
TABLE 6
New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for
the U.S. to achieve decisive battlefield victories.
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New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for
the U.S. to achieve decisive battlefield victories.
advanced technology. The high level of uncertainty in the responses to this statement
may indicate a perception that the answer depends upon the type of conflict and the
character of the opponent. Again, U.S. operations in Kosovo might have had a major
influence on the responses.
Marine Corps officers were most skeptical of the proposition that new technology, op-
erational concepts, and organizations will make it easier for the United States to
achieve decisive battlefield victories; Air Force officers were most enthusiastic (see table
6). Flag officers were more enthusiastic than their juniors. As in the previous questions
in this series, the most interesting aspect of the responses was the disproportionately
positive views of the international officers (see figure 10). While 60 percent of U.S. offi-
cers agreed with the statement, 73 percent of international officers agreed. This sug-
gests that foreign officers have much more confidence in the U.S. ability to exploit
technology than do their U.S. counterparts.
Statement 24e: New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase
the importance of my service relative to the other services.
A common theme within the RMA literature of the 1990s was that long-range strike
would take on some of the missions that had previously required ground forces. This
was also narrowly implied in Joint Vision 2010.85 Another common theme was that ex-
ploitation of advanced technology would allow the United States to field a smaller but
more lethal force to provide the post–Cold War “peace dividend” demanded by the
American public. Analysts like James Blaker proposed significant restructuring of the
T H E L I M I T S O F T R A N S F O R M A T I O N 5 7
198
319
495
223
106
191
346
Strongly Disagree Unsure Strongly Agree
7654321
0
250
500
750
1000
FIGURE 11
New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase the impor-
tance of my service relative to the other services.
forces within each of the services that could conceivably lead to a major change in the
relative importance of the services.86
Officers were about evenly split in their response to this statement, with 35 percent in
agreement and 39 percent opposed (see figure 11). Most significantly, 62 percent
tended toward uncertainty regarding this issue (as reflected by the mean response of
3.87). This uncertainty tracks with responses to other statements dealing with relative
service efforts and priorities, indicating that most officers felt they did not know
enough about what was going on in services other than their own to make any
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 35% 26% 39%
Army 27% 30% 43%
Marine Corps 29% 24% 47%
Navy 22% 31% 47%
Air Force 56% 17% 27%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
36% 27% 37%
Senior Officers 29% 28% 43%
Flag Officers 33% 21% 46%
TABLE 7
New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase the impor-
tance of my service relative to the other services.
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New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase the impor-
tance of my branch relative to others in my service.
definitive statement about relative trends. However, it is interesting to compare these
responses with those to Statement 11, in which 70 percent of the officers surveyed ex-
pressed the opinion that long-range strike would not diminish the need for ground
forces. One could conclude that officers tend to be open to the idea that the relative im-
portance of the services might change, but not that naval or air power will be able to
substitute for ground troops. It is not known what other types of relative force changes
they may have had in mind when responding to this statement.
Responses indicate that Air Force officers believed most strongly that new technology,
operational concepts, and organizations will increase the importance of their service
relative to the other services (see table 7). Officers from the other services were consid-
erably more skeptical.
Statement 24f: New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase
the importance of my Branch relative to others in my service.
This question sought to elicit an evaluation of whether branch or warfare specialties
would change in relative importance within each of the services. Scholars have argued
that revolutions in military affairs frequently alter the relationship between existing
services and combat arms and have triggered the rise of new elites while witnessing the
decline of previously dominant ones.87 During the first half of the twentieth century,
for example, naval aviation assumed a central role in war at sea. As the aircraft carrier
displaced the battleship as the centerpiece of modern navies, naval aviators challenged
the traditional dominance of surface warfare officers. During the same period, ar-
mored forces usurped the cavalry in armies across the globe, and the advent of aircraft
created new elites within armies and eventually spawned new military services.
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 37% 25% 38%
Army 27% 30% 43%
Marine Corps 29% 24% 47%
Navy 22% 31% 47%
Air Force 56% 17% 27%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
40% 26% 34%
Senior Officers 29% 26% 45%
Flag Officers 28% 26% 46%
TABLE 8
New technology, operational concepts, and organizations will increase the impor-
tance of my Branch relative to others in my service.
The responses are nearly identical to those of Statement 24e, with 37 percent positive,
38 percent negative, and a large proportion (58 percent) tending toward uncertainty.
Again, this seems to reflect a great deal of uncertainty within the officer corps as to
how advanced technologies might impact very specific warfare areas.
Air Force officers believed most strongly that new technology, operational concepts,
and organizations will increase the importance of their branch relative to others in
their service (see table 8). The other services were considerably more skeptical. Junior
and field grade officers agreed more strongly with the proposition than did senior and
flag officers.
Summary
Most officers tended to believe that the emerging RMA will make it easier for the U.S. to
use force and for the U.S. to achieve decisive battlefield victories (at least in some sce-
narios). Most officers also believed that it will allow the United States to engage in
high-intensity operations with substantially reduced risk of casualties and that it will
substantially reduce the duration of future conflicts. They also tended to believe that
the U.S. will have a greatly enhanced ability to locate, track, and destroy enemy forces
in limited geographic areas. In general, Army and Marine Corps officers tended to be
somewhat more skeptical than Air Force and Navy officers about the desirable impact
of technological change.
They tended to be much more uncertain in their evaluation of the impact of the RMA
on existing forces. There was substantial uncertainty as to whether the emerging RMA
will allow deep reduction in nuclear forces, or whether the relative importance of their
service or specialty branch will see significant change. Nevertheless, there was a general
consensus that the increasing capability of long-range strike ordnance will not dimin-
ish the need for U.S. ground forces.
Of particular interest is the difference of opinion between U.S. and international mili-
tary officers regarding the impact of the RMA on U.S. military capabilities. Interna-
tional officers tended to believe much more strongly than their U.S. counterparts that
the U.S. will find it easier to use force and to achieve decisive battlefield victories—and
will be able to do so with substantially reduced risk of U.S. casualties.
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Impetus for Change
There is strong historical evidence to support the contention that a common percep-
tion of future threat is required for major transformation to occur. Key decision mak-
ers in the military services, as well as the executive and legislative branches, must
acknowledge that the ultimate cost and risk of maintaining the current force exceeds
the cost and risk of changing to a new operational concept. To this end, we presented
respondents with three statements intended to elicit their views of the future threat to
U.S. power projection forces. We also asked the respondents to rank the relative impor-
tance of six future military challenges.
The most compelling case for a potentially untenable threat to current and future U.S.
forces arises from the proliferation of missiles with both increasing range and accuracy.
The continued spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological technologies presents a
threat of mass destruction to fixed and relatively immobile forces, while the growing
availability of precise targeting information also increases the threat of very precise deliv-
ery of conventional explosives out to ranges in the hundreds of kilometers.88 Given that
the United States has yet to field an effective defense against the ballistic missile, many see
these weapons as the leading edge of a general “anti-access” capability intended to deny
U.S. forces the forward staging needed for regional power projection.89 Foreign develop-
ments in ballistic missile technology were highlighted in the 1990s by such events as the
series of Chinese ballistic missile launches to positions off the coast of Taiwan in 1995
and 1996, and the unexpected launch by North Korea of the Taepodong-1 ballistic missile
over Japan in 1998. The U.S. press provided wide coverage of a series of test failures of
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22a. Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as ballistic and
cruise missiles to attack large ground formations.
22b. Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as ballistic and
cruise missiles to attack carrier battle groups.
22c. Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as ballistic and
cruise missiles to destroy fixed military infrastructure, such as ports, airfields, and logistical sites.
Relative importance of six future challenges: Peer Competitor, Humanitarian Operations,
Emerging Regional Power, Information Warfare, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Terrorism.
the U.S. Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system and
cost overruns and delays in other theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) programs.
The 1998 “Rumsfeld Commission” report on the ballistic missile threat to the United
States contained a number of stark conclusions. The commission found that the ballis-
tic missile “has a high probability of delivering its payload to its target compared to
other means of delivery,” especially with the ongoing incorporation of spaced-based
global positioning guidance.90 It went on to conclude that such missiles in the hands of
hostile nations posed a “serious threat to the Unites States, to its forward-based forces
and their staging areas and to U.S. friends and allies.” The report specifically cited the
potential missile threat to ports, airfields, communications centers, urban areas, and
industry, noting that attacks on “ports and airfields the U.S. might use could severely
hamper operations and could undercut the military advantages U.S. technological su-
periority provides.”
Statement 22a: Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weap-
ons such as ballistic and cruise missiles to attack large ground formations.
Given the widespread press coverage of missile defense issues during the 1990s, the
survey responses to statements regarding the potential missile threats to U.S. power
projection were somewhat surprising. Nearly 8 in 10 officers (78 percent) disagreed
with the statement that future adversaries would be able to attack (not destroy or de-
grade) large ground formations with ballistic or cruise missiles (see figure 1). Slightly
better than half (51 percent) tended toward uncertainty, but less than one in ten offi-
cers (9 percent) expressed any agreement with the statement—and less than 6 officers
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FIGURE 1
Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as
ballistic and cruise missiles to attack large ground formations.
in 1,000 strongly agreed. The mean response of 2.71 reflects the respondents’ disagree-
ment with the statement.
Reasons for the apparent discounting of the threat may include a disagreement about
the severity of the threat, and a simple lack of knowledge among the broad population
of officers with respect to ballistic and cruise missiles, and U.S. missile defenses.
Among the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission was that the threat “posed by these
emerging capabilities is broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly than has
been reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community.”91 These
conclusions have been contested. Nevertheless, the U.S. military imposes no formal
requirements for knowledge about military threats outside of an officer’s tactical-
technical specialty, so a widespread lack of understanding of foreign ballistic and cruise
missiles should not be surprising.92
Another reason for this seeming lack of concern may arise from official statements of
confidence in the ability of the U.S. military to deal with these threats. Joint Vision
2010, for instance, acknowledges a growing foreign threat from advanced technologies,
but concludes that our forces “will achieve [the] required level of protection [emphasis
added]” through “multi-layered defenses of our forces and facilities at all levels.”93
Both of these themes were evident in the focus group surveys. Most officers admitted
that they did not have a full understanding of the potential threat to U.S. power
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 9% 13% 78%
Army 8% 13% 79%
Marine Corps 9% 18% 73%
Navy 9% 12% 79%
Air Force 9% 15% 76%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
8% 14% 78%
Senior Officers 13% 14% 73%
Flag Officers 12% 15% 73%
International Officers 23% 15% 62%
U.S. Officers 9% 13% 78%
TABLE 1
Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as
ballistic and cruise missiles to attack large ground formations.
projection forces, but also expressed great confidence that the United States would
build and field whatever was needed to protect existing forces.
We detected no significant differences in the attitudes of officers from different services
(see table 1). Senior and flag officers were marginally more concerned about the ability of
adversaries to attack large ground formations with ballistic or cruise missiles than junior
officers. More significant was the difference between the attitudes of U.S. and interna-
tional officers. While only 9 percent of American officers agreed with the statement, 23
percent of all international officers we surveyed agreed. It thus appears that America’s
friends and allies see U.S. forces as more vulnerable than do our own officers.
Statement 22b: Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weap-
ons such as ballistic and cruise missiles to attack carrier battle groups.
RMA advocates have argued that aircraft carriers will be increasingly vulnerable to at-
tack by ballistic and cruise missiles. Andrew Krepinevich, for example, has argued that
future adversaries will have an increasing capability to attack U.S. carrier battle groups.94
In one much-publicized war game conducted by the Department of Defense, for exam-
ple, Chinese forces equipped with long-range cruise missiles and satellite reconnaissance
and surveillance reportedly inflicted heavy damage on U.S. carrier battle groups.95
The response to this statement was also somewhat surprising. Nearly three out of four
officers (73 percent) disagreed with the statement that future adversaries would be able
to attack carrier battle groups with such weapons as ballistic and cruise missiles (see
figure 2). The mean response was 2.83. Significantly, the statement posed the problem
in terms of a group of ships and not specifically an aircraft carrier. Moreover, it did not
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Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as
ballistic and cruise missiles to attack carrier battle groups.
use the terms “sink,” “destroy,” or “damage,” but only the term attack—which could
also be construed to include unsuccessful attacks. Half of the respondents tended to-
ward uncertainty on this issue (50 percent), but only 12 percent of the officers ex-
pressed any agreement with this statement, and less than 2 percent strongly agreed.
Navy officers were marginally more concerned about the threat posed by ballistic and
cruise missiles to carrier battle groups than officers of other services (see table 2). Se-
nior and flag officers were slightly more worried than junior officers. Nevertheless, the
consensus among officers of all services and ranks was that carrier battle groups would
continue to be invulnerable from these types of weapons. As with the previous state-
ment, international officers were considerably more concerned about the threat to U.S.
carrier battle groups than were their American counterparts. While only 11 percent of
American officers agreed with the statement that future adversaries would be able to
attack carrier battle groups with ballistic and cruise missiles, 34 percent of interna-
tional officers agreed.
Interestingly, the same question was posed to the service focus groups with a very dif-
ferent response. More than 86 percent of those officers (38 of 44) agreed with the state-
ment and only three officers (all Navy officers) disagreed. However, most of the focus
group participants tended to take the term attack at face value and were very skeptical of
a future adversary’s ability to find and sink, or even seriously damage, an aircraft carrier.
The reason for such high confidence in the security of carrier battle groups among the
broad officer population can only be speculated upon. The focus group participants
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 12% 15% 73%
Army 9% 14% 77%
Marine Corps 9% 18% 73%
Navy 16% 14% 70%
Air Force 13% 15% 72%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
11% 15% 74%
Senior Officers 16% 15% 69%
Flag Officers 12% 19% 69%
International Officers 34% 13% 53%
U.S. Officers 11% 15% 74%
TABLE 2
Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as
ballistic and cruise missiles to attack carrier battle groups.
indicated a general lack of understanding of the current and future threats, but gener-
ally felt that the inherent mobility of the carrier would continue to offer it a high level
of security from being targeted and attacked. The focus groups also expressed tremen-
dous confidence that the technological superiority of the United States would provide
whatever defenses are necessary to protect critical military assets. Responses from the
focus group members indicate that the “aircraft carrier” has achieved tremendous sta-
tus as an icon of U.S. military power worldwide that the United States must, and will,
preserve and protect.
Statement 22c: Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weap-
ons such as ballistic and cruise missiles to destroy fixed military infrastructure, such as
ports, airfields, and logistical sites.
Recent years have also seen increasing concern over the threat ballistic and cruise mis-
siles pose to the infrastructure that the United States requires to project power.96 As for-
mer Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogelman put it, “Saturation ballistic
missile attacks against littoral forces, ports, airfields, storage facilities, and staging areas
could make it extremely costly to project U.S. forces into a disputed theater, much less
carry out operations to defeat a well-armed aggressor. Simply the threat of such enemy
missile attacks might deter the U.S. and coalition partners from responding to aggres-
sion in the first place.”97
The Rumsfeld report specifically singled out ports and airfields necessary for U.S.
power projection as being at risk to foreign missile attack, yet nearly 8 out of 10 officers
(79 percent) surveyed disagreed with this statement (see figure 3). Indeed, more
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Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as
ballistic and cruise missiles to destroy fixed military infrastructure, such as ports,
airfields, and logistical sites.
officers felt strongly about the security of fixed facilities (53 percent responding in
blocks 1 and 2) than about the security of carrier battle groups (44 percent responding
in the same blocks)—despite the fact that focus group participants attributed the secu-
rity of a carrier battle group largely to its mobility. The mean response was 2.59.
One major reason for the disparity is likely the use of the term destroy rather than at-
tack. Focus group participants expressed almost universal skepticism that a port or air-
field could be destroyed in the sense that such a facility could be “put out of existence”
or rendered “totally unusable.” However, participants commonly said that they tended
to interpret the term destroy to simply mean “deny use” for a significant period of time.
Whether the broader survey participants had the same interpretation is unknown.
Again, the responses of the focus group participants were almost the opposite to those of
the survey, with 36 of 44 officers (nearly 82 percent) agreeing with the statement, and
only 6 of 44 (under 14 percent) in disagreement. However, the consensus view of the fo-
cus group respondents was that the United States would assuredly field adequate defenses
to ensure that U.S. forces would not be denied the use of critical bases overseas.
We found no significant differences in response among officers of different services
(see table 3). Senior and flag officers were slightly more concerned about the threat
than were junior officers. More interesting was the disproportionately positive response
of foreign officers to this statement. While only 8 percent of American officers agreed
with the statement, 29 percent of international officers agreed. At face value, this
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 9% 12% 79%
Army 8% 13% 79%
Marine Corps 8% 12% 80%
Navy 7% 13% 80%
Air Force 8% 13% 79%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
8% 13% 79%
Senior Officers 12% 13% 75%
Flag Officers 10% 17% 73%
International Officers 29% 8% 63%
U.S. Officers 8% 13% 79%
TABLE 3
Future adversaries will be able to use long-range precision strike weapons such as
ballistic and cruise missiles to destroy fixed military infrastructure, such as ports,
airfields, and logistical sites.
reflects a belief among America’s friends and allies that U.S. forward bases are at risk of
being destroyed or being put out of service by ballistic and cruise missiles. The potential
operational and strategic implications of this disparity of opinions between U.S. and for-
eign officers with respect to U.S. force vulnerability are worthy of deeper exploration.
Relative importance attributed to six future challenges by service
We asked respondents to provide a relative ranking of the importance of six different
challenges. These were presented as a series of pairs, with the respondents asked to
identify which of the two challenges is more important.
Several general insights can be drawn from the overall rankings (see table 4). The first
is that virtually all officers see the emergence of a “peer competitor” as the least impor-
tant future challenge. This is likely due to a perceived low probability of a military
challenge of comparable power to the U.S. arising in the foreseeable future.
The second insight is that officers seemed to equate lesser importance to those mis-
sions that they had been doing or preparing for in the 1990s—perhaps because of a
greater confidence in their understanding of these challenges and their ability to deal
with them. The missions ranking higher in importance are probably ones that most of
the officers in the survey had not yet had to confront in their operational assignments:
information warfare, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism. Officers may thus be
concerned that the consequences of failure in these so-called “asymmetric” missions
may be quite severe, and yet they are not able to adequately gauge the likely effective-
ness of their forces to deal with them.
Finally, the relative rankings seem to correlate with the degree of individual control
that an officer might feel that he has over his “enemy” in each of these missions. Other
research strongly indicates that individuals tend to perceive an increasing level of per-
sonal risk with a sense of decreasing personal control over future events. The fact that
traditional military tools are often seen to be ill-suited to the demands of terrorism,
WMD, and information warfare might make these appear to be exceptionally risky, and
therefore exceptionally challenging and important operations.
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PEER
COMPETITOR
HUMANITARIAN
OPERATIONS
MAJOR
THEATER WAR
INFORMATION
WARFARE WMD* TERRORISM
Army 0 0.443 0.523 0.761 0.724 1.05
Marine
Corps
0 0.321 0.582 0.713 0.825 1.168
Navy 0 0.656 0.701 0.862 0.788 1.277
Air Force 0 0.686 0.761 1.102 1.094 1.349
TABLE 4
Relative importance attributed to six future challenges by service.
*Weapons of Mass Destruction
Summary
The survey results suggest that, at least in the area of potential threats posed by ballistic
and cruise missiles, the vast majority of officers see no imperative for major changes to
the operational concepts and principal platforms currently used to project U.S. power
abroad. They would seem to have a very high level of confidence in the technological
prowess of the United States to provide “full-dimensional protection” to our critical
warfighting capabilities. This corroborates the confidence most officers expressed in
the United States’ ability to project its information networks against hostile attack, as
shown in chapter 5.
By contrast, the survey indicated that international military officers have much less
confidence that force defenses will be adequate, and tend to believe that major U.S.
ground formations, groups of ships, and fixed infrastructure will be at increasing risk
of attack, and perhaps destruction, by missile attack.
Finally, officers tend to attribute much higher importance to the so-called “asymmet-
ric” challenges by a potential enemy—terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and in-
formation warfare—than to the more traditional challenges of high intensity combat
and humanitarian operations. This may reflect a great deal of uncertainty with respect
to the consequences of asymmetric warfare and the ability of our military to deal with
these missions.
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Character and Depth of Change Required
Most analysts of the emerging Revolution in Military Affairs believe that major
changes in operational concepts and organizations will be required to achieve the full
benefits of this technology-driven revolution. We presented the respondents with
twelve statements intended to assess their views with respect to the character and depth
of change that might occur within the U.S. military over the coming decades.
Scholars argue that a revolution in military affairs is composed of four basic elements:
the emergence of new technologies, the incorporation of those technologies in new
military systems, operational innovations that fully exploit those systems, and finally,
organizational adaptation to a new character of warfare. Andrew Krepinevich is among
those who have called for “radical” changes in both military doctrine and organization
if the RMA is to be realized.98 Eliot Cohen has suggested that “today’s military organiza-
tions—divisions, fleets, and air wings—could disappear or give way to successors that
would look very different.”99 He has gone on to predict that “if the forces themselves
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14. The U.S. armed forces must radically change their approach to warfare to compete effectively
with future adversaries.
15. The U.S. armed forces are currently embarked upon a path that will lead to a radical change
in military technology, doctrine, and organization.
12. It is imperative that the U.S. armed forces become truly joint.
13. The need to maintain separate services will diminish over time.
25c. Modern conditions require significant changes to traditional service roles and missions.
25d. The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for space operations.
25e. The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for information
operations.
25a. My service should reduce its force structure to invest in new approaches to warfare.
25b. My service should reduce its readiness to invest in new approaches to warfare.
25g. My service is serious about exploring new approaches to warfare.
25h. Other services are more serious than mine about exploring new approaches to warfare.
25f. The U.S. armed forces will achieve fully the four pillars of Joint Vision 2010—dominant
maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection—
by 2010.
change, so too would the people, as new career possibilities, educational requirements,
and promotional paths became essential.”100 Among other developments, he suggested the
possible emergence of “new elites” such as “information warriors,” and a breakdown in
traditional service distinctions. Joint Vision 2010 prescribed no specific changes, but did
state that “new operational procedures and organizations” would be required for imple-
menting the basic concepts of the Vision.101 It went on to suggest that more agile organi-
zations and processes might be called for, including “increased organizational flexibility
and further reductions in supervision and centralized direction.”102
Statement 14: The U.S. armed forces must radically change their approach to warfare to
compete effectively with future adversaries.
The responses to this statement resulted in a bimodal distribution, with the largest
number in agreement (47 percent), but with a nearly as large percentage in disagree-
ment (41 percent). A critical unknown is the respondents’ interpretation of the term
“radical.” Lack of definition of this point may have been a major factor in nearly
two-thirds of the respondents (64 percent) leaning toward uncertainty (the second
largest response in this category throughout the survey). The mean response of 4.14
further illustrates this uncertainty. By contrast, focus group participants leaned much
more strongly toward the positive categories (71 percent) than the unsure categories
(44 percent)—with only 29 percent in disagreement.
An important aspect of this statement is that it does not portray radical change as an
opportunity for the United States to increase its relative dominance, but rather as a
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FIGURE 1
The U.S. armed forces must radically change their approach to warfare to compete
effectively with future adversaries.
necessity for the U.S. military to simply remain competitive with future adversaries.
The implication is that if the U.S. military does not change radically, it will cease to be
competitive in the future. It is significant that more than half of the officers (59 per-
cent) either agreed with this conclusion or were uncertain. Less than half of the officers
surveyed believed that the U.S. military could remain competitive without radical
change, and only one in five (20 percent) believed strongly that radical change was not
required. This would appear to contradict earlier responses indicating that officers
were not concerned with the ability of adversaries to deny the United States the use of
information networks or interfere with U.S. power projection capabilities.
We noted significant differences in attitude among officers of the various services (see
table 1). Marine Corps officers believed most strongly that the U.S. armed forces must
radically change to remain competitive; Navy officers saw the least need to change.
There were no significant differences in the attitudes of officers of different ranks.
Statement 15: The U.S. armed forces are currently embarked upon a path that will lead
to a radical change in military technology, doctrine, and organization.
Nearly half of the officers surveyed (48 percent) believed that the U.S. armed forces
were currently undergoing “radical” change—nearly the same number as those who
believed that radical change was required. Only a third of the officers (33 percent) dis-
agreed with this statement. The highest percentage of respondents (71 percent) leaned
toward uncertainty on this issue—the highest response in this category throughout the
entire survey. The mean response of 4.21 obviously suggests that most officers are very
unsure about this issue.
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 47% 12% 41%
Army 48% 13% 39%
Marine Corps 56% 6% 38%
Navy 41% 9% 50%
Air Force 43% 13% 44%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
46% 13% 41%
Senior Officers 48% 11% 41%
Flag Officers 45% 16% 39%
TABLE 1
The U.S. armed forces must radically change their approach to warfare to compete
effectively with future adversaries.
A comparison of the responses to statements 14 and 15 suggests that a large number of
the respondents believed that unnecessary radical change may be underway. More im-
portantly, nearly half of the officers surveyed (48 percent) believed that what the ser-
vices were doing, or were planning to do, in mid-2000 could be characterized as a
“radical” departure from the systems, operational concepts, and organizations that
were dominant in the decade of the 1990s. This suggests something of a “dialogue of
the deaf ” between advocates of truly radical change—that is a major departure from
existing systems, concepts, and organizations—and the large percentage of officers
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FIGURE 2
The U.S. armed forces are currently embarked upon a path that will lead to a radical
change in military technology, doctrine, and organization.
AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 48% 19% 33%
Army 52% 20% 28%
Marine Corps 46% 15% 39%
Navy 36% 22% 42%
Air Force 44% 15% 41%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
50% 19% 31%
Senior Officers 41% 20% 39%
Flag Officers 37% 30% 33%
TABLE 2
The U.S. armed forces are currently embarked upon a path that will lead to a radical
change in military technology, doctrine, and organization.
(two-thirds of those surveyed) who believed that radical change either was, or might
be, ongoing. This helps explain the reported friction between Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld and other civilian leaders of the Defense Department, on the one hand, and
military leaders, on the other, regarding the Bush administration’s plans to transform
the U.S. armed forces.103
Army officers expressed the greatest confidence that the U.S. armed forces were em-
barked upon a path that will lead to radical change (see table 2). Navy officers were
least convinced. There was also a correlation between an officer’s rank and his view of
whether the U.S. armed forces are currently in the midst of radical change: the higher
an officer’s rank, the less confident and more uncertain he tended to be.
Among focus group participants, Army officers were most strongly in agreement with
this statement, Navy officers fell squarely in the mid-range, and Air Force and Marine
Corps officers were predominantly in disagreement. The Army officers tended to be-
lieve that “radical” change could be accomplished with current dominant ground
systems (such as the M-1 Abrams MBT)—or with new types of manned, armored ve-
hicles (such as the Future Combat System). Marine Corps officers tended to believe
that “radical” change implied a much higher degree of jointness than had yet been
achieved, or was likely. Air Force officers tended to equate “radical” change to de-
velopments that substituted technology for human functions (such as “100 percent
man-out-of-the-loop”). Most saw such developments as inevitable, but character-
ized the current pace as slow evolution (one termed it “glacial”) rather than rapid
revolution. Navy officers were decidedly ambivalent on this issue, with some seeing
ongoing plans for major crew reductions on surface ships as “radical,” while others
deeming as radical only some future, widespread substitution of unmanned for
manned systems.
Statement 12: It is imperative that the U.S. armed forces become truly joint.
“Jointness” has been a major theme of U.S. military doctrine for nearly two decades,
and was enshrined in law by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. Joint Vision 2010 refers
to the “Imperative of Jointness,” driven primarily by “flat budgets” that will require us
to “wring every ounce of capability from every available source.”104 It goes on to con-
clude that this outcome
can only be accomplished through a more seamless integration of service capabilities.
To achieve this integration while conducting military operations, we must be fully
joint: institutionally, organizationally, intellectually, and technically.105
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Other analysts of the RMA predict that emerging technological capabilities will serve to
break down the distinction between the different regimes of warfare—sea, air, and
land—and thus the traditional differentiation between the services.106
This statement elicited an overwhelmingly positive response from the survey partici-
pants, with 85 percent of the officers in agreement with the statement, and nearly seven
in ten (69 percent) leaning toward strong agreement. The mean response of 5.73 re-
flects this. This of course begs the question of what these officers construed “truly
joint” to mean—and how that might differ from the current organizational relation-
ships. The responses to subsequent statements provide some indication that most offi-
cers do not foresee what might be termed “radical” change to the status quo. It is also
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 85% 3% 12%
Army 85% 3% 12%
Marine Corps 71% 2% 27%
Navy 80% 4% 16%
Air Force 88% 4% 8%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
84% 4% 12%
Senior Officers 84% 5% 11%
Flag Officers 86% 4% 10%
TABLE 3
It is imperative that the U.S. armed forces become truly joint.
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FIGURE 3
It is imperative that the U.S. armed forces become truly joint.
unknown what the respondents considered to be the “imperative” for jointness (e.g.
budget constraints or military effectiveness), and whether they believed the U.S. mili-
tary was moving toward or away from a more joint force.
A substantial majority of officers of all services believed that it is imperative that the
U.S. armed forces become truly joint (see table 3). Still, there were noticeable differ-
ences: while 71 percent of Marine Corps officers agreed with the statement, 88 percent
of Air Force officers agreed. We detected no meaningful differences in responses by of-
ficers of different ranks.
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The need to maintain separate services will diminish over time.
AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 37% 11% 52%
Army 42% 13% 45%
Marine Corps 18% 2% 80%
Navy 29% 6% 65%
Air Force 33% 9% 58%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
37% 13% 50%
Senior Officers 38% 8% 54%
Flag Officers 24% 17% 59%
TABLE 4
The need to maintain separate services will diminish over time.
Statement 13: The need to maintain separate services will diminish over time.
More than half of the respondents (52 percent) disagreed with the notion that there
will be a diminished need to maintain separate services. Nevertheless more than one in
three officers (37 percent) agreed with the statement, and nearly half (45 percent)
leaned toward uncertainty. The mean response was 3.68. It is interesting to compare
these responses with those to Statement 12. Although an overwhelming majority be-
lieved that true jointness was an imperative, only a third of the officers responding
equated this to a diminished need for separate services.
Army officers believed most strongly that the need to maintain separate services will
diminish over time, with 42 percent agreeing with the statement (see table 4). By con-
trast, only 18 percent of Marine Corps officers agreed. Junior and senior officers—who
have spent most if not all of their careers under the system put in place by the 1986
Goldwater-Nichols Act—felt much more strongly than flag officers that the need for
separate services would diminish.
Statement 25c: Modern conditions require significant changes to traditional service
roles and missions.
More than half of the survey respondents (59 percent) agreed that significant changes
were required to traditional service roles and missions. However, only slightly more
than one in four officers (28 percent) tended to strongly agree with this statement, and
nearly as many officers (58 percent) leaned toward uncertainty as agreed with the state-
ment. The mean response was 4.47. Nevertheless, less than one in three officers (32
percent) responded that significant change was not required. It is not known how the
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Modern conditions require significant changes to traditional service roles and missions.
officers interpreted the term “significant,” nor what specifically they might have char-
acterized as significant changes to existing service roles and missions.
Sixty percent of Army officers and 57 percent of Air Force officers agreed with the
proposition that modern conditions require significant changes to traditional service
roles and missions (see table 5). By contrast, only 37 percent of Marine Corps officers
agreed with the statement. The percentage of officers that believed that significant
changes to traditional service roles and missions were warranted increased with the re-
spondent’s rank. Whereas 57 percent of junior and field grade officers felt that a change
in service roles and missions was needed, 62 percent of senior officers and 73 percent
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 59% 9% 32%
Army 60% 11% 29%
Marine Corps 37% 6% 57%
Navy 51% 7% 42%
Air Force 57% 8% 33%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
57% 11% 32%
Senior Officers 62% 7% 31%
Flag Officers 73% 8% 19%
TABLE 5
Modern conditions require significant changes to traditional service roles and missions.
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The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for space operations.
of flag officers agreed. When combined with responses to the previous question, it ap-
pears that flag officers think that while the roles and missions of individual services
should change, there is still a strong need to maintain separate services.
Statement 25d: The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for
space operations.
More than half (57 percent) of the officers surveyed disagreed with the notion of creating
a new service responsible for space operations. Only one in four (25 percent) expressed
support for the concept. However, just about the same number of respondents (43 per-
cent) leaned toward uncertainty as did those who tended toward strong disagreement
(blocks 1 and 2). The mean response was 3.14. Overall though, the responses tend to
track with those to Question 12, which showed very strong support for increased
“jointness” and, by implication, a reduction in service or functional specialization.
Army officers were most supportive of the proposition that the Defense Depart-
ment should create a new service responsible for space; Marine Corps officers were
least supportive (see table 6). These responses track closely with attitudes toward
changing service roles and missions. In contrast with responses to that statement,
however, here we detected no significant difference in the attitudes of officers of
different ranks.
Statement 25e: The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for in-
formation operations.
Some RMA advocates have argued that information is so central to military operations
and so highly specialized as a discipline that the Defense Department should consider
forming an “information corps”—a new armed service that would be responsible for
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 25% 18% 57%
Army 25% 25% 50%
Marine Corps 19% 11% 70%
Navy 20% 11% 69%
Air Force 21% 13% 66%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
24% 22% 54%
Senior Officers 23% 14% 63%
Flag Officers 22% 9% 69%
TABLE 6
The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for space operations.
managing and coordinating all defense information needs.107 Others counter that infor-
mation is so integral to all military functions that all military personnel should be “in-
formation warriors.”108 Nearly two-thirds of the respondents (62 percent) expressed
disagreement with the idea of creating a new service for information operations. The
number in favor of such a new service (25 percent) was about the same as those who
expressed agreement with the idea of a new service for space (Statement 25d.), but
more of those who were unsure about a space service expressed opposition to an infor-
mation service. The mean response was 3.06. The overall reason for the strong level of
opposition to a new service focused on information is not known. One can only
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 25% 13% 62%
Army 27% 18% 55%
Marine Corps 14% 11% 75%
Navy 19% 10% 71%
Air Force 16% 12% 72%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
25% 17% 58%
Senior Officers 19% 11% 70%
Flag Officers 18% 13% 69%
TABLE 7
The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for information
operations.
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The Defense Department should create a new service responsible for information
operations.
speculate that officers either felt that information is so integral to all aspects of military
operations that it would not be prudent to establish a separate organization, or they
were expressing opposition to the idea that their own services might cede important
prerogatives to a new and separate bureaucracy.
As with the previous item, Army officers were most supportive of the creation of a new
service responsible for information operations; Marine Corps officers were least sup-
portive (see table 7). The percentage of officers that advocated the formation of an in-
formation service decreased with the respondent’s rank. Whereas 25 percent of junior
and field grade officers supported such a move, only 19 percent of senior officers and
18 percent flag officers agreed.
Statement 25a: My service should reduce its force structure to invest in new approaches
to warfare.
Joint Vision 2010 reflected the predominant climate of the post–Cold War era in pre-
dicting that the military budget would remain “flat,” while readiness and moderniza-
tion would be “increasingly more costly.”109 The implication was that investments in
new approaches to warfare could be achieved only by reducing force structure or current
readiness. James Blaker, for his part, has argued that transforming the U.S. armed forces
would allow the U.S. government to reduce the defense budget by $40 billion per year.110
As responses to this statement demonstrated, more than three out of four officers (77
percent) opposed reductions in the force structure of their own service to invest in fu-
ture capabilities. More than half of the officers (57 percent) leaned toward strong dis-
agreement, while only about a third (35 percent) tended toward uncertainty on the
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My service should reduce its force structure to invest in new approaches to warfare.
issue. The mean response was 2.55. The statement did not provide for any reduction in
missions or current commitments, and so a reduction in force structure might have
been interpreted as simply infeasible. Nevertheless, these responses track with those to
Statement 15, which indicates that nearly half of the officers believed that radical change
was already ongoing—without any reduction, or need for reduction, in force structure.
Marine Corps officers were most adamantly opposed to reducing force structure to in-
vest in new ways of war: only 6 percent favored the proposition and 94 percent op-
posed it; none was unsure (see table 8). This is understandable, given that the Marine
Corps’ force structure of three active and one reserve division is enshrined in law.
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 16% 7% 77%
Army 15% 7% 78%
Marine Corps 6% 0% 94%
Navy 16% 4% 80%
Air Force 16% 9% 75%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
12% 2% 79%
Senior Officers 26% 6% 68%
Flag Officers 24% 9% 67%
TABLE 8
My service should reduce its force structure to invest in new approaches to warfare.
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My service should reduce its readiness to invest in new approaches to warfare.
Junior and field grade officers were more strongly opposed to reductions in force struc-
ture than senior and flag officers. They may equate cuts in force structure with reduced
opportunities for promotion and command; post-command senior and flag officers are
presumably less motivated by such concerns.
Statement 25b: My service should reduce its readiness to invest in new approaches to
warfare.
Respondents were even more adamant in their rejection of reducing current readiness
to invest in new approaches to warfare, with almost nine out of ten (87 percent) in dis-
agreement. In fact, this statement elicited the strongest negative response of any in the
survey, with more than half of the officers (52 percent) responding in extreme disagree-
ment (block 1). Nearly three quarters of the officers (74 percent) leaned toward strong
disagreement, while less than one in four (22 percent) tended toward uncertainty. The
mean response of 2.02 illustrates the level of disagreement with the statement.
A similar statement was put to the focus group participants, but with the stipulation
that commitments would be reduced commensurate with a reduction in readiness.111
Focus groups still rejected the proposal overwhelmingly. Respondents indicated that
they tended to equate readiness to basic unit training and equipment availability across
their service—and did not feel that there was any margin for reductions in these areas
regardless of the level of force commitment. Moreover, these responses track with those
to Statement 15 which indicated that nearly half of the officers surveyed believed that
radical change was already ongoing without any need for a reduction in force readiness.
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 9% 4% 87%
Army 9% 5% 86%
Marine Corps 5% 1% 94%
Navy 6% 3% 91%
Air Force 9% 4% 87%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
8% 2% 86%
Senior Officers 9% 5% 86%
Flag Officers 11% 11% 78%
TABLE 9
My service should reduce its readiness to invest in new approaches to warfare.
Marine Corps and Navy officers were particularly averse to reducing readiness to invest
in new approaches to warfare (see table 9). Flag officers were slightly more willing to
contemplate such trades than junior or senior officers.
Statement 25g: My service is serious about exploring new approaches to warfare.
This statement was intended to determine the level of confidence officers had in their
own services’ efforts to innovate. Nearly three-quarters of the officers (72 percent)
agreed with the statement, suggesting a high level of confidence in their own service.
However, more than half of the officers (52 percent) leaned toward uncertainty, with a
mean response of 4.97. The implication is that most officers were confident that their
own service was serious about innovation, but there was a relatively high level of un-
certainty as to what would be required for a “new approach” to warfare, what their own
service was doing in this area, and how serious it really was about change.
At least two-thirds of the officers of each service believed that their service was serious
about exploring new approaches to warfare (see table 10). Marine Corps officers were
convinced that their service was committed to exploring new ways of war: 95 percent
agreed with the statement, and 5 percent disagreed; none were unsure. By contrast, 67
percent of Navy officers believed their service was serious about examining new ap-
proaches to combat.
In general, these results confirm those of the Military Climate-Culture Survey conducted
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The latter survey, which consisted
of Army staff officers and the broader Army population, included two related statements:
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My service is serious about exploring new approaches to warfare.
• “Our organization can adjust to new technologies and changing doctrine.
• Our leaders consider the future, exploring new doctrine, tactics, equipment
and procedures.”112
Respondents reacted quite positively to the first statement, as they did to the similar
statement contained in our survey. Indeed, their response ranked in the top twenty
most favorable responses in the survey. However, the CSIS survey revealed a significant
split between Army leaders and the broader Army population regarding the willingness
of Army leaders to adapt to such changes. Specifically, the survey’s results showed that
while Army leaders believe they are adapting to the RMA, soldiers do not feel that their
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Other services are more serious than mine about exploring new approaches to warfare.
AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 72% 9% 19%
Army 73% 8% 19%
Marine Corps 95% 0% 5%
Navy 67% 11% 22%
Air Force 71% 9% 20%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
71% 10% 19%
Senior Officers 71% 11% 18%
Flag Officers 72% 15% 13%
TABLE 10
My service is serious about exploring new approaches to warfare.
leaders are changing fast enough.113 Our survey, by contrast, did not yield a sharp dif-
ference in attitudes between senior and junior officers.
Statement 25h: Other services are more serious than mine about exploring new ap-
proaches to warfare.
This statement was intended to determine how officers felt about their own service’s ef-
forts at innovation relative to those of the other services. More than four in ten officers
(44 percent) expressed confidence that their own service was no less serious about in-
novation than any of the others. However more than one-third of the officers (34
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 22% 34% 44%
Army 25% 40% 35%
Marine Corps 5% 14% 81%
Navy 25% 32% 43%
Air Force 14% 26% 60%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
22% 37% 41%
Senior Officers 21% 28% 51%
Flag Officers 11% 37% 52%
TABLE 11
Other services are more serious than mine about exploring new approaches to warfare.
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FIGURE 12
The U.S. armed forces will achieve fully the four pillars of Joint Vision 2010—dominant
maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection—
by 2010.
percent) expressed complete uncertainty (block 4), and nearly seven in ten leaned to-
ward that category, with a mean response of 3.57. The implication is that there was a
great deal of uncertainty as to what other services are doing with respect to innovation,
but also a good deal of confidence among officers that their own service could not be
less innovative than any of the others.
A large majority of Marine Corps officers were convinced that no service was more se-
rious about exploring new ways of warfare than theirs (see table 11). Only 5 percent
agreed that other services were more committed than the Marine Corps, while 81 per-
cent disagreed. Army officers were the most uncertain about the commitment of other
services. Also of note is the fact that flag officers—who presumably know the most
about other services—had more confidence that their service was most serious about
exploring new ways of war than did junior or senior officers.
Statement 25f: The U.S. armed forces will achieve fully the four pillars of Joint Vision
2010—dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-
dimensional protection—by 2010.
Published in 1996, Joint Vision 2010 was presented as the “conceptual template” for
achieving “full spectrum dominance” by the end of the first decade of the 21st cen-
tury. It stated that, by 2010, the U.S. military should be able to exploit advanced tech-
nologies to transform the traditional functions of maneuver, strike, protection, and
logistics into the four new operational concepts, or “pillars,” of dominant maneuver,
precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection. By contrast,
others argue that Joint Vision 2010’s dependence upon information superiority makes
it unrealistic.114
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AGREE UNSURE DISAGREE
Overall 28% 21% 51%
Army 26% 25% 49%
Marine Corps 24% 11% 65%
Navy 22% 20% 58%
Air Force 29% 16% 55%
Junior/Field Grade
Officers
28% 23% 49%
Senior Officers 27% 18% 55%
Flag Officers 43% 20% 37%
TABLE 12
The U.S. armed forces will achieve fully the four pillars of Joint Vision 2010—dominant
maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection—
by 2010.
Of the officers surveyed, only 28 percent agreed with this statement—and only 10 per-
cent leaned toward strong agreement (blocks 6 and 7). By contrast, more than half of
the officers (51 percent) disagreed. The mean response was 3.54. The reason for such a
high level of skepticism is not known. The focus group participants indicated that or-
ganizational change (rather than technology) would likely be the biggest impediment
to this type of force “transformation,” and seriously questioned the “political will” of
both the military and Congress to actively support the changes that would be required.
Nearly two-thirds of the officers (64 percent) in the broad survey leaned toward unsure
categories (blocks 3, 4, and 5), suggesting a good deal of uncertainty about the specifics
of Joint Vision 2010, the prospects of achieving its goals, or both.
Air Force officers believed most strongly that the U.S. armed forces would achieve fully
the four pillars of Joint Vision 2010 by 2010; Marine Corps officers were most skeptical
(see table 12). Flag officers believed more strongly than did junior or senior officers.
Summary
The survey results indicate that nearly half of the officers believed that “radical” change
is required if the U.S. is to compete effectively with future adversaries. Perhaps more
significantly, two-thirds of the officers believed that “radical” change in military tech-
nology, doctrine, and organization was, or might have been, underway (they either
agreed with the statement or were unsure). These findings support the contention that
there was something of a “dialogue of the deaf ” between advocates of truly radical
change—that is a major departure from existing systems, concepts, and organiza-
tions—and the large percentage of officers who believed that radical change either al-
ready was, or might have been, ongoing.
Strong support was expressed for the achievement of “true” jointness among the services
and significant changes to traditional service roles and missions. However, most officers
did not believe that the need for separate services would diminish, nor did they support
creation of new military services responsible for space or information operations.
Officers expressed a very strong opposition to reducing the force structure or readiness
of their own service to invest in new approaches to warfare, but most believed that
their own service was nevertheless serious about innovation.
Finally, there was widespread skepticism that the goals of Joint Vision 2010—the “con-
ceptual template” for future joint warfighting—would actually be achieved by the end
of this decade.
A significant insight from this section of the survey was the high level of uncertainty
among most officers regarding the character and depth of change that is required for
the U.S. military to compete effectively with future adversaries. This uncertainty is
T H E L I M I T S O F T R A N S F O R M A T I O N 8 9
especially strong over the issue of whether “radical” change is required, and whether
such change is currently underway. This suggests that a very large percentage of the of-
ficer corps is not confident about its understanding of how technology might change
the conduct of warfare—and what changes to systems, concepts, and organizations
might be desirable or necessary.
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Trends in Officer Attitudes
While the survey provided insight into officer attitudes at a point in time, we used an
analysis of articles on innovation, transformation, revolution in warfare, and the mili-
tary exploitation of new technologies appearing in the primary U.S. military profes-
sional journals between 1990 and 2000 to assess trends in attitudes over time.
Findings
Authors. Figures 1 and 2 depict the affiliations of the authors by grade and service. Be-
cause some authors wrote multiple articles, there were 257 different principal authors
of the 345 articles. Authors were primarily field grade or senior officers (i.e. O-4, O-5,
and O-6). Of note, there was only one relevant article authored by an enlisted person.
Five of the 257 authors were females—two civilians and three military officers. The fe-
male authors were all senior Air Force officers.
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FIGURE 1
Authors by grade.
The vast majority of authors were officers from the four active services and civilians.
Some of the civilians were known to be military retirees, although we could not accu-
rately determine the exact numbers from the biographical information provided in the
journals. Likewise, some authors who were civilians might also have had an unrevealed
affiliation with the military Reserves. Three of the articles were written by international
officers from India, Brazil, and the United Kingdom.
Attitude. Figure 3 depicts the attitudes of the authors toward the revolution in mili-
tary affairs (RMA) for each year of the survey. Figure 4 shows the same data presented
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FIGURE 2
Authors by service.
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FIGURE 3
Attitude by year.
as a percentage of the total articles. After 1990, articles expressing a positive attitude to-
ward the RMA consistently outnumbered those that were either ambivalent or skeptical.
Moreover, those with a positive tone outnumbered both skeptical and ambivalent arti-
cles in all years except 1990 and 1998.
Figure 5 shows the attitudes of the authors by service affiliation. Figure 6 depicts the
same data as a percentage of authors by service. As can be seen, more than two-thirds
of the authors from the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps characterized the RMA as
attainable and favoring the United States. Army authors were less enthusiastic, but
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Attitude by year as a percentage of articles.
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FIGURE 5
Attitude by service.
more than half were nonetheless positive about the RMA’s impact. Only civilian authors
demonstrated a preponderance of skepticism or ambivalence.
These results are somewhat at variance with the results of the 2000 survey. The latter
indicated that Army and Marine Corps officers were consistently more skeptical of the
RMA than were Navy and particularly Air Force officers. Of course, the survey involved
the full range of officers attending professional military education (PME) courses, while
the literature analysis involved only those officers and civilians who felt passionately
enough about the subject to write about it.
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Attitude by service as a percentage of articles.
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FIGURE 7
Attitude by grade.
Figure 7 depicts the attitudes of the authors by grade. Figure 8 shows the same data as a
percentage of authors by grade. Of note, there was an inverse relationship among the
non-flag officers between positive attitude and rank—with positive attitude declining
steadily from the most junior officers through O-6. However, the highest positive re-
sponse, nearly 80 percent, was in the flag ranks. Although we did not specifically ana-
lyze the content of flag-authored articles to determine a possible reason for the positive
tone, many tended to promote specific current military systems or programs that the
author sought to associate with the positive attributes of “revolutionary” change.
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Attitude by grade as a percentage of articles.
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
N
W
C
R
EV
IE
WJF
Q
ST
R
AT
R
EV
IE
W
PA
R
A
M
ET
ER
S
M
IL
R
EV
IE
W
PR
O
C
EE
D
IN
G
S
M
C
G
A
ZE
TT
E
0
Positive Ambivalent Skeptical
A
ER
O
SP
A
C
E
FIGURE 9
Attitude by journal.
Nevertheless, at least 50 percent of all officer grades exhibited a decidedly positive atti-
tude toward the RMA. The lowest positive response among major groupings of authors,
and the only one to fall below 50 percent, came from civilians.
Here too, the results of the literature analysis differ from those of the 2000 survey. The
latter found a less pronounced relationship between rank and attitude. To the extent
that one did exist, it was senior rather than junior officers who tended to be most en-
thusiastic about the RMA. The fact that authors are self-selecting would appear to ac-
count for this discrepancy. In other words, while the vast majority of field-grade
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FIGURE 10
Imperative by year.
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FIGURE 11
Imperative by year as percentage of articles.
officers may be more skeptical about the RMA than their seniors, those field-grade offi-
cers who feel passionately about the subject are more positive than seniors who feel the
same way.
Figure 9 depicts the attitude of the articles broken out by journal. Of interest is the
high level of uncertainty that characterized the articles in the Joint Force Quarterly
(published by the National Defense University for the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and the
nearly even breakdown of attitudes appearing in the pages of the Army War College’s
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Imperative by service.
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FIGURE 13
Imperative by service as a percentage of articles.
journal, Parameters. We could not determine whether these outcomes were random or
were the result of the journals’ editorial policy.
Imperative. Figure 10 depicts the primary catalyst for change reflected in each of the
articles over the period of the survey. Figure 11 shows the catalyst as a percentage of ar-
ticles for a given year. Only in 1990 (the year with the fewest articles on this subject)
was threat alone portrayed as the predominant reason for pursuit of the RMA. However,
opportunity alone was at or above 50 percent in only three years of the survey (1992,
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Imperative by grade.
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FIGURE 15
Imperative by grade as percentage of articles.
1993, and 2000), indicating that most authors in most years felt that the United States is
compelled to take action to avoid some risk or penalty posed by the changing character
of warfare.
The results of the literature analysis provide an interesting contrast with those of the sur-
vey. As noted in chapter 8, more than half of the officers that we surveyed felt that the
U.S. armed forces needed to change radically to compete with future adversaries or were
uncertain. On the other hand, large majorities of officers were unconvinced that future
foes would be able to hold at risk major elements of our national power projection
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FIGURE 16
Call to action by year.
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Call to action by service.
capability or information infrastructure. In other words, it appears that authors are more
concerned about the penalty for not transforming than are the overall officer population.
Figure 12 shows the imperative by service, and figure 13 the same data presented as a
percentage of authors in each service. As can be seen, authors in the Navy were most
prone to see opportunity alone as the primary reason for change—and this was the
only group of authors in which opportunity was seen as the predominant catalyst in
more than 50 percent of the articles. Opportunity as the primary imperative drops
steadily in articles by the Marines, Air Force officers, Army officers, and finally
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Call to action by grade.
civilians. However, only among the civilian authors did threat exceed opportunity, and
in none of these groups was threat alone seen as the predominant catalyst for change.
Figures 14 and 15 depict the imperative for change by grade of author. For all groups,
threat alone was seen as a minor catalyst—not rising above one in three. In contrast to
the officer attitude survey, the flag-grade authors showed the least concern for the
threat aspects of the RMA, with only one in ten seeing threat alone as the primary rea-
son for change. As noted above, this may stem from the fact that many of the flag-
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Call to action by grade as a percentage of articles.
written articles were seeking to promote specific future capabilities or systems that
were perhaps touted as representative of an RMA as a marketing technique rather than
an objective assessment of the impact of revolutionary change.
Call to Action. Figure 16 depicts the trend by year for those authors who concluded
that action is required to achieve an RMA, and for those who concluded that such an
outcome is inevitable (thus the only challenge being how we are to deal with such
change). Those seeing a need for action consistently outnumbered by more than two to
one those who believed that the U.S. military is inexorably evolving into an RMA capa-
bility. Moreover, the call to action has continued to rise as a percentage of all articles
since 1997. Figures 17 and 18 show the call to action broken out by service affiliation.
Figures 19 and 20 depict the call to action by grade. As can be seen, there is no major
variation among the services or grades of the authors.
Use of Terms. Finally, figure 21 shows the number of articles using the terms “revolu-
tion,” “innovation,” and “transformation” (with each term counted only once per arti-
cle). The terms appeared in sequence in the early 1990s, as subsequent articles dealing
with RMA issues began to focus more on the processes required to achieve revolution-
ary goals. All three terms reached a peak appearance in 1997, with the term “revolution”
dropping off steadily in subsequent years, while “innovation” and “transformation”
continued to hold strong. This may reflect a general perception in the literature that
the term “revolution” had perhaps become so widely employed in the mid-1990s that
it was losing both its impact and a consistent definition—while the need for innova-
tion and transformation were undiminished. Nevertheless, articles using the term
“revolution” continued to outnumber those using either of the other terms through
the year 2000.
Conclusions
One must be careful in attempting to draw definitive conclusions from a literature
analysis such as this. The attitudes of the authors of these professional journal articles
do not necessarily reflect the attitudes of the officer corps as a whole. Moreover, this
study covered an eleven-year period when each of the services was transitioning out of
its Cold War force justification and undergoing a dramatic drawdown in personnel.
Thus the articles represent an evolving series of attitudes of a small number of self-
selected individuals who were conversant in this subject and felt compelled to put their
ideas in print.
Since many of the authors in the survey published more than one article, an interesting
question is whether a change in attitude could be tracked among those who published
at different promotion levels over a sequence of years. Only 10 of the 257 different
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principal authors in the survey were commissioned officers who published at different
grades. Most of these (a total of six) published at both the O-5 and O-6 level. Only one
officer published at three different grade levels (O-3, O-4, and O-5).
Nevertheless, there are some general insights that might be drawn from the literature
survey:
First, the call for action remained very strong, but threat alone was seen as a minor cat-
alyst for change. Most journal articles portrayed future opportunity as the primary rea-
son that the U.S. military should transform itself.
Second, junior officers and enlisted personnel published the least among all grades on the
subject of technology-driven change, yet these were the individuals who were most likely
to be directly operating those future technologies with potentially revolutionary impact.
Third, the consistent call for action in the military’s primary professional journals over
the past decade was not reflected in the officer attitude survey conducted in 2000. It is
possible that most officers do not find the argument for change compelling. On the
other hand, it would appear that most officers simply do not read their own profes-
sional journals. Focus group participants were queried on the extent to which they sub-
scribe to, or read, the eight principal journals. About half stated that they “occasionally”
read articles from at least one of the journals, but less than one in ten Army and Navy
officers, and less than three in ten Air Force officers said that they regularly read most
or all of any one journal. This low level of readership suggests that the military profes-
sional journals are a poor venue for the promotion of new ideas within the military
officer corps.
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Conclusions and Implications
As we noted at the beginning of this monograph, analysts have characterized the atti-
tudes of the U.S. officer corps toward innovation in various ways. Some have asserted
that the culture of the U.S. armed forces emphasizes technology over other, less tangi-
ble, determinants of battlefield success, such as training and leadership.115 To them, the
U.S. armed forces have embarked upon a quest for the Holy Grail of “dominant battle-
space knowledge,” while ignoring the persistence of friction on the modern battlefield.116
Others have argued, with equal force, that the U.S. military is reluctant to embrace new
ways of war, particularly those that threaten existing weapons, doctrine, and organiza-
tions. Rather than adapt to the information age, they see the services as perpetuating
increasingly outmoded approaches to combat.117
While our study yielded some evidence to support each view, it also revealed how sim-
plistic such characterizations may be. On the one hand, our survey found that the U.S.
armed forces are highly supportive of information-age ways of war, at least in the ab-
stract. For example, 85 percent of the officers we surveyed believed that forces employ-
ing information-age technology, doctrine, and organizations would enjoy a substantial
edge over those that do not. Seventy-five percent felt that new ways of war would give
the United States dominance over the full range of adversaries. A majority of officers
predicted that information-age ways of war would make it easier to use force with deci-
sive results and a reduced risk to U.S. casualties. They also believed strongly in the
growing importance of space and cyberspace. Seventy-six percent felt that within the
next twenty years conflicts would include combat operations in or from space. Eighty-
five percent believed that within the same period computer network attack would be-
come a central feature of military operations. A large number felt that we either are, or
may be, undergoing “radical” change to information age ways of warfare.
What exactly “radical” change is, however, is open to interpretation. The officers we
surveyed tended to equate transformation with marginal improvements to current
weapons and doctrine rather than the development of fundamentally new capabilities.
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A majority believed that today’s dominant systems—tanks, manned aircraft, and air-
craft carriers—would be as important in twenty years as they are today. And the vast
majority of officers were unwilling to reduce force structure or readiness to invest in
new approaches to warfare. In fact, such statements garnered the strongest negative re-
sponses of the survey. Perhaps the fact that many officers believe that “radical” change
is already underway explains why they see no reason to reduce force structure or readi-
ness to invest in new approaches to warfare.
Our reading of past cases of transformation suggests that change is often triggered by
the recognition of a pressing strategic or operational problem that cannot be handled
through improvements to the existing force, but rather requires a new approach. Dur-
ing the 1920s and 1930s, for example, the expectation of a two-front war helped prod
the German army into exploring the potential of combined-arms armored warfare and
tactical aviation.118 During the same period, the possibility that the United States would
have to cross the Pacific to defend or re-conquer the Philippines from Japan drove the
U.S. Navy to explore offensive carrier warfare and the U.S. Marine Corps to develop
amphibious landing doctrine.119 The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, for its part, ar-
gues that the Defense Department’s transformation efforts should focus upon over-
coming six emerging strategic and operational challenges:
• Protecting critical bases of operations, including the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies,
and friends, and defeating weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
• Assuring information systems in the face of attack and conducting effective
information operations;
• Projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access or area-denial
environments and defeating anti-access and area-denial threats;
• Denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid
engagement with high-volume precision strike against critical mobile and fixed targets;
• Enhancing the capability and survivability of space systems and supporting
infrastructure; and
• Leveraging information technology and innovative concepts to develop an
interoperable, joint C4ISR architecture and capability that includes a joint
operational picture that can be tailored to user needs.120
The officers whom we surveyed expressed great confidence in the ability of the U.S.
armed forces to deal effectively with such threats. They did not believe that adversaries
would be able to hold at risk the primary elements of U.S. power projection. Only 9
percent felt that future adversaries would be able to use ballistic or cruise missiles to
destroy fixed infrastructure, such as ports, airfields, and logistical sites. Twelve percent
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predicted that they would be able to attack carrier battle groups. They were also skepti-
cal of the ability of future adversaries to deny the United States the use of information
networks. In each case, they may be unaware of current and projected threats or may
believe that current programs are sufficient to deal with these challenges.
Understanding Officer Attitudes
What accounts for these attitudes? Where do they come from, and what might cause
them to change? Two major explanations seem plausible. The first is that the culture of
the armed services plays a dominant role in shaping officer attitudes. Even in an era of
jointness, an officer derives his primary identity from his service. Moreover, each service
has a unique personality, one shaped by its history, traditions, mission and operational
environment.121 If this hypothesis is correct, then the views of an Army major are likely to
resemble those of an Army colonel more closely than those of an Air Force major.
Another explanation is that an officer’s experiences play a prominent role in shaping
his views. Today’s junior and field-grade officers entered the armed forces at the very
end of the Cold War, if not after. To them, the U.S.-Soviet competition is an increas-
ingly remote and abstract historical event. Rather, they have spent the majority of their
military career in a period of unquestioned U.S. military, political, and economic dom-
inance. They have witnessed or participated in a series of conflicts in which American
technological superiority appears to have played a central role. Senior and flag officers,
by contrast, joined the U.S. armed forces either during or immediately after the Viet-
nam War. They lived through the demoralization that followed the U.S. withdrawal
from Southeast Asia, the hollow armed forces of the mid- to late-1970s, and a string of
failed or partially successful military operations, such as the 1980 failed Iran hostage
rescue mission and the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. It is reasonable
to suppose that these experiences have produced officers with different attitudes to-
ward innovation and transformation. If this view is correct, then the attitudes of our
hypothetical Army major are likely to resemble those of a major in the Air Force or
Marine Corps or a lieutenant commander in the Navy more closely than those of an
Army colonel.
Another source of experience is combat. War is one of the most intense events that a
human can face. It seems plausible that those who have seen combat will have attitudes
markedly different from those who have not. In particular, one might expect officers who
have witnessed the friction of combat—particularly in low intensity combat operations—
to be more skeptical of technology-driven changes in war than those who have not.
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Service Affiliation
In chapter one we hypothesized that an officer’s service affiliation might influence his
attitude toward innovation. Specifically, we predicted that Air Force officers would be
the most enthusiastic about, and Army and Marine Corps officers the most skeptical
of, emerging warfare areas, with Navy officers in the middle. The results of this project
support this hypothesis. Indeed, it is telling that more than fifteen years after the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, which was designed to make the U.S. armed forces more
“joint,” service affiliation remains the strongest determinant of officer attitudes that we
could identify.
Army and Marine Corps officers were consistently more skeptical of the proposition
that we are experiencing a revolution in warfare than their Navy and Air Force coun-
terparts. Army officers who chose to write about innovation issues were the least en-
thusiastic of any group of military officers. Army and Marine Corps officers who
participated in the survey tended to feel most strongly that today’s dominant weapon
systems and organizations would be as important in the future as they are today. Con-
versely, they tended to be more skeptical than their Navy and Air Force counterparts
that the information revolution is changing the character of warfare. They believed less
strongly than other officers that the United States was embarked upon a path to radical
change. Indeed, they were the most doubtful of the need for the U.S. armed forces to
change radically.
Air Force officers, by contrast were as a group the most supportive of the notion that we
are experiencing an RMA. Air Force authors of articles on innovation and transformation
were more enthusiastic than their counterparts in the other services. Many Air Force offi-
cers who participated in our survey believed that coming years would witness a reduction
in the importance of currently dominant systems. Indeed, half predicted that manned
aircraft would become less important—and unmanned systems such as the UCAV more
important—over time. They tended to feel most strongly that the information age would
allow the United States to use force more easily, with greatly reduced chance of incurring
U.S. casualties, and with a greater chance of achieving a decisive victory.
Navy officers were more skeptical than Air Force officers but more enthusiastic than Army
and Marine Corps officers. Not surprisingly, they held the strongest belief in the enduring
importance of the carrier battle group. However, they also felt strongly that information-
age ways of war would make it increasingly easy for the United States to use force and
achieve decisive victories with substantially reduced risk of American casualties.
While we detected significant service differences throughout most of the survey, several
areas were marked by consensus. For example, officers of all services believed that
space and cyberspace would play an increasingly important role in combat. They felt
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that future adversaries would not be able to hold at risk the U.S. power projection in-
frastructure and information networks. They also were unwilling to support tradeoffs
between force structure and readiness, on the one hand, and investment in transforma-
tion, on the other.
Enthusiasm toward the revolution in military affairs appears to be related to the ser-
vice’s reliance upon advanced technology. In absolute terms, of course, the U.S. armed
forces utilize more information-age technology than many foreign militaries. However,
not all services rely upon hardware (and software) to the same extent. The U.S. Air
Force relies most heavily upon technology, followed by the Navy. The Army and Marine
Corps are less technology-intensive services. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Air
Force and Navy officers are more enthusiastic than Army and Marine Corps officers
about the ability of information-age systems, doctrine, and organizations to change the
character and conduct of warfare.
The conduct of recent conflicts may have reinforced these tendencies. Throughout the
1990s, the United States relied heavily upon standoff, air-delivered weapons in combat.
Air power—in the form of manned aircraft and unmanned cruise missiles—was the
weapon of choice. Moreover, the United States’ advantage in high-technology arms ap-
peared to play a major role in its lopsided victories in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans
in the 1990s. By contrast, conflicts with more ambiguous outcomes, such as Somalia
and Haiti, involved ground forces. It is therefore hardly surprising that Air Force—and
to a lesser extent Navy—officers believed more strongly than their Army and Marine
Corps counterparts that the information revolution is changing the character of war.
Branch Affiliation
While service affiliation was a major determinant of officer attitudes, we found no
overall correlation between an officer’s attitudes and branch affiliation. Officers did,
however, strongly believe in the enduring importance of their branches. For example,
while 51 percent of all officers felt that armored and mechanized formations would be
as important in 2020 as they were in 2000, 72 percent of Army armor branch officers
agreed with the statement. Similarly, 58 percent of the overall survey population, but
65 percent of aviators, believed that manned aircraft would be as important in 20 years
as they are today. And 45 percent of space officers were in favor of the establishment of
a separate space service, compared to 25 percent of the general survey population.
These findings imply that civilian and military leaders should exercise care in finding
organizational homes for innovative weapons, organizations, and concepts. Rather
than trying to turn fighter pilots into unmanned aerial vehicle operators, for example,
it might be worthwhile to look to other communities, such as intelligence personnel, to
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fill these roles. Rather than turning tank drivers into operators of light armored vehi-
cles, it might be worthwhile to consider vehicle operators.
Combat Experience
While we hypothesized that the attitudes of veterans would differ from those of
non-veterans, we found no correlation between an officer’s combat experience and his
attitudes toward transformation. Rather, combat veterans and non-veterans displayed
similar attitudes toward the emerging RMA, its impact on today’s dominant weapons,
its effect on the character of war, and the depth of change that is required to exploit the
information revolution. Nor did veterans of a particular conflict have views that dif-
fered from non-veterans. It may be that the veterans’ combat experience did not prove
particularly compelling. Or it may have affected different people in ways that on aver-
age offset one another. In either case, combat experience did not make officers notice-
ably more enthusiastic or skeptical toward innovation.
Rank
We hypothesized that an officer’s rank would influence his attitude toward innovation.
In particular, we speculated that lower- and middle-ranking officers were likely to be
more enthusiastic about new ways of war than senior officers. In fact, we found that an
officer’s rank had a much less pronounced impact upon his attitudes toward innova-
tion than his service affiliation. Moreover, the influence of rank was not clear-cut. On
the one hand, our analysis of articles on innovation revealed flag officers to be the most
enthusiastic of any group of respondents. This was particularly true when they were
advocating a particular program. Below the flag ranks, however, we detected an inverse
relationship between an officer’s rank and his enthusiasm toward innovation; the
higher an officer’s rank, the less enthusiastic he tended to be.
The results of the survey revealed a somewhat different picture. In many cases there
were no significant differences in attitude among officers of various ranks. In those in-
stances where there were significant differences, senior officers tended to be more en-
thusiastic than junior officers. The higher an officer’s rank, for example, the less his
enthusiasm and the greater his uncertainty regarding the continued importance of to-
day’s dominant weapons.
The relationship between an officer’s rank and his attitude toward innovation is thus a
complex one. Having spent less time in uniform than their superiors, junior officers
are likely less influenced by service culture. However, junior officers have a narrow base
of experience upon which they can draw. While they are experts in their specialty, they
have little experience outside their branch or community. Moreover, most are quite
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naturally concerned with promotion, something that their service and branch controls.
Such concerns moderate any desire to challenge the conventional wisdom.
The picture is just as mixed when it comes to senior officers. On the one hand, they
have had more time to become indoctrinated into their service’s culture. On the other,
they have served longer in the military and have had the opportunity to witness more
change throughout their careers. They also have much greater experience outside their
branch or service than junior officers.
It appears that junior officers do not see transformation as something that is important
to them. Our focus groups show that while some junior officers think about new ways of
war, few read professional journals and very few are sufficiently motivated to actually
write about emerging ways of war. While junior and field-grade officers make up the ma-
jority of the officer corps, they wrote only one-third of the articles that we examined.
In short, we found that both culture (expressed through service affiliation) and experi-
ence (expressed through rank) affected officer attitudes. One way to judge the relative
importance of these factors would be to examine how, if at all, the 11 September 2001
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and subsequent events
have changed officer attitudes. If organizational culture is more important than experi-
ence, then one should expect service attitudes to remain relatively stable despite these
developments. Conversely, if experience plays a more dominant role, then one would expect
the post-911 events to trigger attitude changes that would overwhelm service culture.
Implications for Policy
The results of this project should give policy makers pause. They reveal an officer corps
that is confident in the ability of the United States to control the terms of an engage-
ment in a war against a competent adversary. While we should wish that that would be
the case, officers seem generally uninformed regarding future threats outside of their
own tactical specialties, particularly those involving ballistic and cruise missiles and in-
formation warfare. Indeed, in these areas officers appear to have confidence bordering
on complacency. While the officers who participated in our survey expressed great faith
in their service’s commitment to innovation, their understanding of current Defense
Department initiatives was tempered by their limited exposure to professional military
journals. In addition, by their own admission, they lacked an understanding of devel-
opments outside their service.
This lack of broad knowledge about future threats and the capabilities and limitations
of emerging weapon systems and doctrine may not present a problem so long as offi-
cers are not required to make operational or programmatic decisions beyond their own
tactical-technical expertise. However, as officers become more senior, they tend to be
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assigned to both service and joint positions with responsibilities that extend well across
many tactical specialties. This raises the questions of what specifically senior officers,
and especially flag officers, need to know about warfare to be fully effective in such as-
signments—and how they are to gain this knowledge.
It is worth emphasizing that the officers we surveyed were students at professional mil-
itary education institutions. The remainder of the officer corps is, if anything, less well
informed. It would seem prudent for the military to seriously question the adequacy of
our officer training and education programs in the areas of future threats and joint
warfighting capabilities. Moreover, the Defense Department needs to consider ways to
disseminate critical information outside of an officer’s relatively infrequent assignment
to formal training and education programs. The fact that officers pay little attention to
professional military journals implies that this will be a challenge.
The results of this study also highlight the need for the Defense Department leadership
to define what is meant by “transformation.” The Quadrennial Defense Review notes
that “Transformation results from the exploitation of new approaches to operational
concepts and capabilities, the use of old and new technologies, and new forms of orga-
nization that more effectively anticipate new or still emerging strategic challenges and
opportunities and that render previous methods of conducting war obsolete or subor-
dinate.”122 While a reasonable starting point, such a definition lacks a specific articula-
tion of the missions and attributes of the transformed force, how those attributes are
to be measured, and the relevance of existing systems, concepts, and organizations to
that goal. The latter is a particularly difficult problem. The leadership of the Defense
Department has so far avoided the programmatic and budgetary implications of de-
fense transformation. Early suggestions of force structure changes and program cancel-
lations yielded a firestorm of objections from the services, Congress, and the defense
industry. Since then, there has been an absence of open discussion of transformation,
particularly those elements that could threaten existing programs. However, it seems
unlikely that any meaningful debate over the merits of transformation can occur with-
out a serious discussion of the viability of current systems. This includes a realistic dis-
cussion of emerging threats that might render current approaches untenable over the
long term—thus requiring new approaches. This is obviously difficult, because it is
hard to determine combat outcomes in the absence of combat. Moreover, it is difficult
to discuss the threat objectively without moving rapidly into programmatic issues.
In short, advocates of major change have their work cut out for them. They must for-
mulate a compelling rationale for transformation, one that will resonate with the broad
officer corps. They also must develop a strategy for educating the officer corps about
transformation. Our analysis suggests that most officers are open to the prospect of
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change if they are provided a good rationale, but that they have yet to hear a compelling
argument for adopting significant alternatives to existing forces. Efficient and timely
transformation requires a clear rationale and an effective means to communicate that
message.
Topics for Further Research
The results of this project suggest several avenues for future research. First, they dem-
onstrate the need for additional research and analysis to refine further our understand-
ing of military officer attitudes toward transformation. In particular, are there any
threats or opportunities that might justify truly major force changes? What would they
define as major or “radical” changes? How confident are they in their own ability to
make such assessments? How concerned are those who are not confident in their
knowledge/abilities? How much confidence do they have in those they believe are
charged with those decisions? What do they see as the most significant attributes of the
future transformed force? Why do or might they discount some of the threats posed by
the QDR? How much confidence do they have in those assessments? Can they conceive
of any future problems/threats that cannot be countered directly with superior U.S.
technological “know-how”? Do they have confidence in advanced technological solu-
tions to very thorny problems like defense against ballistic and cruise missiles, mines,
torpedoes, submarines, and information attacks?
We would also like to know more about how officers get their information. Do they
read professional journals? What do they think of them? Why do they not read jour-
nals? Do they read books? Do they read anything outside of tactical-technical manuals?
A second, related, task would be to measure the impact of the war on terror on officer
attitudes toward transformation. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon may, for example, have affected officer attitudes toward the type and severity
of threats that the United States is likely to face in the future. Similarly, the conduct of
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM may
have altered officers’ attitudes toward the utility of current weapon systems, the desir-
ability of emerging ways of war, or the character of information-age warfare. It would
therefore be desirable to conduct a post–September 11 survey of the officer corps.
Third, this project has uncovered several areas where the attitudes of U.S. officers di-
verge markedly from those of America’s friends and allies. International officers see the
United States as more capable of using force to achieve decisive battlefield results with
a substantially reduced chance of incurring casualties than their U.S. counterparts.
However, they also see the United States as more vulnerable to anti-access and
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information warfare threats than American officers. It would therefore be useful to sur-
vey foreign officers more systematically and in greater depth.
Finally, it would be useful to survey officers assigned to “innovative” units within the
U.S. armed forces, including the Army’s medium-weight Interim Brigade Combat
Teams (IBCTs) and Air Force unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) squadrons. Such a survey
could help determine whether hands-on experience with innovative systems, doctrine,
and organizations increases enthusiasm for transformation. It would also reveal how
members of these organizations perceive their status within their respective services.
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Survey Instrument
A Survey of Attitudes Toward Future Warfare
In recent years, a number of observers in the military, government, and academia have
argued that we are experiencing a revolution in military affairs brought on by the
growth and diffusion of stealth, precision, and information technology. They argue
that emerging technology, coupled with innovative operational concepts and organiza-
tions, will substantially alter the conduct of war on land, at sea, and in the air. War may
also expand into outer space and the information spectrum.
Emerging technology and concepts may alter the character and conduct of war in at
least two ways. The first is that long-range precision strike weapons, coupled with very
effective sensors and command and control systems, will become a dominant factor in
future warfare. The second is that protection of the effective and continuous operation
of one’s own information systems, and being able to degrade, destroy, or disrupt the
function of the opponent’s, will become a priority. Other concepts may emerge as well.
This survey is designed to evaluate your attitudes about future warfare. After you an-
swer a few background questions, you will find that the majority of items ask you to in-
dicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with a statement by simply placing a
mark at the corresponding location on a seven point rating scale. Two additional items
ask you to indicate which factor in a pair of factors is most important.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
A
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• Did you receive the Kuwait Liberation Medal for participation in
Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM?
 Yes  No
• Did you participate in combat or combat support operations in the
BALKANS?
 Yes  No
• Did you participate in combat or combat support operations in
SOMALIA?
 Yes  No
• Did you participate in combat or combat support operations in HAITI?  Yes  No
• Have you completed a resident PME course?  Yes  No
INDICATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH YOU
AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH EACH
STATEMENT BY PLACING A MARK ON
THE SCALE TO THE RIGHT OF IT.
I
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
  
I
AM
UNSURE
  
I
STRONGLY
AGREE

• Military forces employing
information-age technol-
ogy, doctrine, and organi-
zations will enjoy a
substantial edge over those
that do not.
• The exploitation of new
technology, doctrine, and
organizational concepts
will favor the U.S. over the
full spectrum of potential
adversaries.
• Other states have no incen-
tive to exploit new technol-
ogy, doctrine, and
organizational concepts.
• Adversaries will exploit
new technology, doctrine,
and organizational con-
cepts before the U.S. can
field similar capabilities.
• New technology, opera-
tional concepts, and orga-
nizations will give
adversaries an advantage
over the U.S. in future
conflicts.
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
What is your age?
How many years of commissioned service do you have? Years
What is your designator/MOS/specialty?
Your Rank?
O-1 O-2 O-3 O-4 O-5 O-6 O-7 O-8 Other
Your service?
USA/
USAR
USN/
USNR
USMC/
USMCR
USAF/
USAFR
USCG ARNG ANG Inter-
national
Civilian
Your highest degree received?
BA/BS MA/MS Ph.D/
MD/JD
Other College Major?
Citizenship (if other than U.S.)
T H E L I M I T S O F T R A N S F O R M A T I O N 1 1 7
• Those who believe that
emerging technology will
substantially alter the con-
duct of war are unrealistic.
• The ability to strike an ad-
versary with precision from
a distance will diminish the
need for the U.S. to field
ground forces.
• It is imperative that the
U.S. armed forces become
truly joint.
• The need to maintain sepa-
rate services will diminish
over time.
• The U.S. armed forces
must radically change their
approach to warfare to
compete effectively with
future adversaries.
• The U.S. armed forces are
currently embarked upon a
path that will lead to a rad-
ical change in military tech-
nology, doctrine, and
organization.
I
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
  
I
AM
UNSURE
  
I
STRONGLY
AGREE

• Information systems and
networks are highly vulnera-
ble to enemy
countermeasures.
• Armored and mechanized
formations will be as im-
portant in 2020 as they are
today.
• Manned aircraft will be as
important in 2020 as they
are today.
• Carrier Battle Groups will
be as important in 2020 as
they are today.
WITHIN THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS:
I
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
  
I
AM
UNSURE
  
I
STRONGLY
AGREE

• Sensor and command and
control technology will al-
low the U.S. armed forces
to locate, track, and de-
stroy enemy forces within a
limited geographic area,
regardless of enemy
countermeasures.
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SAMPLE  “FACTOR A”  OR  “FACTOR B”
 or 
Which is more important?  Technology  or  Doctrine
Which is more important?  Technology  or  Manpower
Which is more important?  Technology  or  Training
Which is more important?  Doctrine  or  Manpower
Which is more important?  Doctrine  or  Training
Which is more important?  Manpower  or  Training
WITHIN THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS:
I
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
  
I
AM
UNSURE
  
I
STRONGLY
AGREE

• Conflicts will include com-
bat operations in or from
space.
• Attacks upon computer
networks will become a
central feature of military
operations.
• The continued incorpora-
tion of conventional
precision-guided munitions
into U.S. forces will permit
deep reductions in the U.S.
nuclear stockpile.
• Uninhabited combat aerial
vehicles will become the
predominant means of
conducting strike warfare.
• Four factors that play a role in the conduct of war are paired against each other below. For
each pair, check the box adjacent to the factor you think is the more important of the two.
While it may be difficult to choose between one factor or another, for the purposes of this
survey, consider which factor in each pair is more important “after all things are consid-
ered” or “in the final analysis.” In the “sample” below, the box checked adjacent to “A”
indicates “A” was considered more important than “B” after all things were considered.
FUTURE ADVERSARIES WILL BE
ABLE TO . . .
NOW

IN 5
YEARS

IN 10
YEARS

IN 15
YEARS

IN 20
YEARS

IN > 20
YEARS

NEVER

a. Use long-range preci-
sion strike weapons
such as ballistic and
cruise missiles to attack
large ground
formations.
b. Use long-range preci-
sion strike weapons
such as ballistic and
cruise missiles to attack
U.S. carrier battle
groups.
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“Challenge A”  or  “Challenge B”
 or 
Which will be
more challenging?
Humanitarian Operations  or  Weapons of Mass Destruction
Humanitarian Operations  or  Terrorism
Humanitarian Operations  or  Information Warfare
Humanitarian Operations  or  Expansionist Regional Powers
Humanitarian Operations  or  Peer Competitors
Weapons of Mass Destruction  or  Terrorism
Weapons of Mass Destruction  or  Information Warfare
Weapons of Mass Destruction  or  Expansionist Regional Powers
Weapons of Mass Destruction  or  Peer Competitors
Terrorism  or  Information Warfare
Terrorism  or  Expansionist Regional Powers
Terrorism  or  Peer Competitors
Information Warfare  or  Expansionist Regional Powers
Information Warfare  or  Peer Competitors
Expansionist Regional Powers  or  Peer Competitors
FUTURE ADVERSARIES WILL BE
ABLE TO . . .
NOW

IN 5
YEARS

IN 10
YEARS

IN 15
YEARS

IN 20
YEARS

IN > 20
YEARS

NEVER

c. Use long-range preci-
sion strike weapons
such as ballistic and
cruise missiles to de-
stroy fixed military in-
frastructure, such as
ports, airfields, logisti-
cal sites.
d. Deny the U.S. the use
of information
networks.
• Six challenges that confront the U.S. are paired against themselves below. For each pair of
challenges, place a check in the box next to the challenge you feel is more important of the
two. For example, in the “sample” below, if you thought “A” was more of a challenge
than “B,” you’d place a check in the box next to “A.”
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NEW TECHNOLOGY, OPERATIONAL
CONCEPTS, AND ORGANIZATIONS
WILL . . .
I
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
  
I
AM
UNSURE
  
I
STRONGLY
AGREE

a. Offer the ability to engage
in high-intensity operations
with substantially reduced
risk of U.S. casualties.
b. Substantially reduce the
duration of future
conflicts.
c. Make it easier for the U.S.
to use force.
d. Make it easier for the U.S.
to achieve decisive battle-
field victories.
e. Increase the importance of
my service relative to the
other services.
f. Increase the importance of
my Branch relative to oth-
ers in my service.
SERVICE IMPLICATIONS
I
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
  
I
AM
UNSURE
  
I
STRONGLY
AGREE

a. My service should reduce
its force structure to invest
in new approaches to
warfare.
b. My service should reduce
its readiness to invest in
new approaches to
warfare.
c. Modern conditions require
significant changes to tra-
ditional service roles and
missions.
d. The Defense Department
should create a new service
responsible for space
operations.
e. The Defense Department
should create a new service
responsible for information
operations.
f. The U.S. armed forces will
achieve fully the four pillars
of Joint Vision 2010—
dominating maneuver,
precision engagement,
focused logistics, and
full-dimensional protec-
tion—by 2010.
Further Discussion
Would you be willing to participate in a focus group discussing your views regarding
future warfare at greater length? If so, please provide your name, home phone number,
and e-mail address below.
Name: ________________________________________
Home Phone: ________________________________________
E-mail: ________________________________________
T H E L I M I T S O F T R A N S F O R M A T I O N 1 2 1
SERVICE IMPLICATIONS
I
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
  
I
AM
UNSURE
  
I
STRONGLY
AGREE

g. My service is serious about
exploring new approaches
to warfare.
h. Other services are more se-
rious than mine about ex-
ploring new approaches to
warfare.

Focus Group Survey Instrument
In recent years, a number of observers in the military, government, and academia have
argued that we are experiencing a revolution in military affairs brought on by the
growth and diffusion of stealth, precision, and information technology. They argue
that emerging technology, coupled with innovative operational concepts and organiza-
tions, will substantially alter the conduct of war on land, at sea, and in the air. War may
also expand into outer space and the information spectrum.
Emerging technology and concepts may alter the character and conduct of war in at
least two ways. The first is that long-range precision strike weapons, coupled with very
effective sensors and command and control systems, will become a dominant factor in
future warfare. The second is that protection of the effective and continuous operation
of one’s own information systems, and being able to degrade, destroy, or disrupt the
function of the opponent’s, will become a priority. Other concepts may emerge as well.
This survey is designed to evaluate your attitudes about future warfare. After you an-
swer a few background questions, you will find that the majority of items ask you to in-
dicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with a statement by simply placing a
mark at the corresponding location on a seven point rating scale. Two additional items
ask you to indicate which factor in a pair of factors is most important.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
B
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INDICATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH
YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH
EACH STATEMENT BY PLACING A
MARK ON THE SCALE TO THE RIGHT
OF IT.
I
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
  
I
AM
UNSURE
  
I
STRONGLY
AGREE

• Manned aircraft will be as
important in 2020 as they
are today.
• Carrier Battle Groups will
be as important in 2020 as
they are today.
• Conflicts will include com-
bat operations in or from
space.
• Future adversaries will be
able to deny the U.S. the
use of information
networks.
• Future adversaries will be
able to use long-range pre-
cision strike weapons such
as ballistic and cruise mis-
siles to destroy fixed mili-
tary infrastructure, such as
ports, airfields, logistical
sites.
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
What is your age?
How many years of commissioned service do you have? Years
What is your designator/MOS/specialty?
Your Rank?
O-1 O-2 O-3 O-4 O-5 O-6 O-7 O-8 Other
Your service?
USA/
USAR
USN/
USNR
USMC/
USMCR
USAF/
USAFR
USCG ARNG ANG Inter-
national
Civilian
Your highest degree received?
BA/BS MA/MS Ph.D/
MD/JD
Other College Major?
Citizenship (if other than U.S.)
• Did you receive the Kuwait Liberation Medal for participation in
Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM?
 Yes  No
• Did you participate in combat or combat support operations in the
BALKANS?
 Yes  No
• Did you participate in combat or combat support operations in
SOMALIA?
 Yes  No
• Did you participate in combat or combat support operations in HAITI?  Yes  No
• Have you completed a resident PME course?  Yes  No
T H E L I M I T S O F T R A N S F O R M A T I O N 1 2 5
INDICATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH
YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH
EACH STATEMENT BY PLACING A
MARK ON THE SCALE TO THE RIGHT
OF IT.
I
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
  
I
AM
UNSURE
  
I
STRONGLY
AGREE

• Future adversaries will be
able to use long-range pre-
cision strike weapons such
as ballistic and cruise mis-
siles to attack U.S. carrier
battle groups.
• The U.S. armed forces
must radically change their
approach to warfare to
compete effectively with
future adversaries.
• The U.S. armed forces are
currently embarked upon a
path that will lead to a rad-
ical change in military tech-
nology, doctrine, and
organization.
• My service should reduce
its force structure to invest
in new approaches to war.
• My service should reduce
its readiness to invest in
new approaches to war.
Of the following professional journals: Parameters, Naval War College Review, Proceed-
ings, Joint Force Quarterly, Aerospace Power Journal, Military Review, Marine Corps Ga-
zette, and Strategic Review:
• To which, if any, do you subscribe?
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
• Which, if any, do you read every issue?
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
• Which, if any, do you read occasionally (i.e., more than once per year)
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
• Do you ever discuss articles in these journals with your colleagues? How often?
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
• Give the subject of two articles from any of the journals published in the past year
that you have found particularly noteworthy.
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
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